
Greek Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century: A Focus on Cyprus*

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THE TWO INTERRELATED THEMES of this essay are that Greek Cypriot nationalism did not emerge as a significant ideology in 1821 but much later; and that, until the occupation of Cyprus by Britain in 1878, the Greek Cypriot "nationalists" followed the lead of Constantinople (the Ecumenical Patriarchate) rather than that of Athens. Cyprus was one of the last areas of Hellenism to experience a national awakening; and Constantinople was considered, at least until 1878, as a more appropriate example for the national aspirations of Cypriot Hellenism.

In the waning years of Ottoman-Turkish rule, Cypriot Hellenism did not experience the set of economic and social transformations and the intellectual enlightenment which converged to give birth to the modern Greek nation-state. Indeed, if we test the conditions prevailing in the Greek-inhabited territories of the Ottoman Empire in the century prior to 1821 against the apolitical uniformities which Karl Deutsch perceived in analyzing the growth of the concept of nation,¹ only in Cyprus and in various regions of Anatolia, particularly Pontos, do we find most of these uniformities conspicuously absent. They are not observable on the island until the second half of the nineteenth century; and do not translate into a mass political movement until the twentieth century.

The shift from subsistence agriculture to exchange economies

In the century prior to 1821, subsistence agriculture in Cyprus was not transformed into a process of producing for sale in the markets. Moreover, Cyprus hardly participated in the expansion of Ottoman trade with Europe to meet the rising demands of western cities for

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¹Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," *World Politics*, 5, 2 (January, 1953) 172-73. The uniformities are listed in the main body of the text.

foodstuffs and of western industries for agricultural products or fibers. Indeed, throughout most of the Ottoman period, there was in Cyprus a significant decline of population and of agricultural production due to the heavy taxation of the peasant as against impoverished agricultural resources, and to the ruthless manner of levying it. The peasant could not accumulate capital to improve his holdings, let alone extend the cultivated areas. The imperial treasury absorbed most of the island's income and denied investments to meet the island's needs. Public works were totally absent. The place of Cyprus in the Ottoman Empire was that of a tax farm. In other words, Cyprus formed part of the rural hinterland of the Ottoman capital, and its surplus agricultural production, whenever available, was to a large extent absorbed by the Ottoman aristocracy outside of Cyprus.

The further deterioration of conditions in Cyprus occurred during the second half of the eighteenth century as a result of a series of earthquakes, prolonged droughts, periodic invasions of locusts, followed by plague and famine, and a succession of rebellious, tyrannical, and utterly corrupt administrations, such as those of Çil Osman Ağa (1764) and Hacı Abdül Bakı Ağa (1777).² There were also frequent depredations by privateers which laid waste the coastal regions. The plague of 1760 alone swept off a third of the island's population and left whole villages desolate.³ In 1777 there were 564 agglomerations or villages in Cyprus compared to 700 in 1600 and 865 in 1885. In addition to the decrease in the number of villages, there was a significant reduction in the population of the surviving villages and towns.⁴

The following travelers' accounts of Cyprus in 1801 and 1814 respectively underline the oppressive and desolate state of the island:

The Greeks are so oppressed by their Turkish masters, that they dare not cultivate the land: the harvest would instantly be taken from them if they did. Their whole aim seems to be to scrape together barely sufficient, in the course of the whole year, to pay their taxes to the Governor. The omission of this is punishment by torture, or by death: and in cases to their inability to supply the impost, the inhabitants fly from the island.⁵

²Theodore Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data on Population (1570-1881)* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Center, 1965), pp. 33-77; see also Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 (Cambridge, 1952). See also Michael Attalides, *Social Change and Urbanization in Cyprus* (Nicosia, 1981).

³Philip Newman, *A Short History of Cyprus* (London, 1953), p. 179.

⁴Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data*, pp. 37, 57.

⁵Edward Daniel Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa* (London, 1812), pp. 340-41.

... there was not a simple object on which the eye might repose with pleasure. I saw neither villages nor trees, nor even shrubs excepting the small thorn before mentioned which covered a vast and dreary flat, over which we travelled for thirteen miles to the villages of Ormidia.⁶

... this flat (the plain north of Nicosia) had the appearance of great fertility, but it was neither inhabited nor cultivated.⁷

The decline in trade and population during the eighteenth century further attests to the abject conditions of life in Cyprus. The estimated value of Cypriot exports declined from about £140,000 in 1745⁸ to well under £100,000 in 1815.⁹ The upward trend in exports began after 1840 and by 1861 reached an estimated value of a mere £145,000.¹⁰

Shortly after the Ottoman Turks occupied Cyprus in 1571, the island had a population of 160,000, including 20,000 Turkish settlers, soldiers, and administrators. The combined Greek and Turkish populations in 1691 amounted to 144,000; and in the first two centuries of Ottoman rule the ratio of population was 3 or 4 Greeks (Christians) to 1 Turk (Muslim). However, in the period 1760-90, the total population dipped to under 80,000 with a ratio of 1 or 2 Greeks to 1 Turk; and by 1801, a particularly bad year, the total population of the island fell to under 60,000. In 1815, the population of Cyprus rose to 70,000. And by 1847, it reached 117,000, with a ratio of 3 Greeks to 1 Turk.¹¹

In brief, Cyprus was hardly one of the rising regions of greater intensity of trade and exchange within the Ottoman Empire.

The social mobilization of rural populations in core areas of denser settlement and more intensive exchange

Although the Greek Cypriots from the smaller populated villages often took refuge or sought relief in larger rural agglomerations, in times of crisis, it can hardly be said that "social mobilization of the rural population in core areas of denser settlement . . ." occurred during this period. There were hardly core areas of more "advanced" regions

⁶John Macdonald Kinneir, *Journey through Asia Minor, Armenia, and Koordistan in the Years 1813 and 1814* (London, 1818), p. 179.

⁷Ibid., pp. 191-92.

⁸Claude D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria: Materials for a History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1908), pp. 281-82.

⁹Ibid., p. 371.

¹⁰Evans (Larnaca) to the Department of State, March 21, 1863, Microcopy T 463, roll 2, *National Archives of the United States Foreign Affairs Division* (Washington, D.C., 1960) (hereafter cited as *NA*).

¹¹For the various population estimates see the invaluable work of Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data*, pp. 3-68. Also Attalides, *Social Change*, pp. 46-47.

The growth of basic communication grids, linking important rivers, towns, and trade routes in a flow of transports, travel, and migration

Basic communication grids certainly did not grow during this period. On the contrary, the previous existing communication grids were dislocated and dismantled. Roads and ports were neglected, and towns fell into decay. In the case of Famagusta, formerly one of the greatest of commercial cities and ports of the eastern Mediterranean, there was a total eclipse. In the Ottoman period, the town practically ceased to exist. Most nations do not seem to have grown from a stage of having single centers, and this was historically the case of Cyprus. However, in the period of Ottoman-Turkish rule, Nicosia became the sole administrative center on the island, serving as its capital. Also, its central location, the fertility of the soil in its surrounding countryside, and its nodal position at an intersection of major inland transportation routes, primitive as they were, contributed to its importance in the early years of Ottoman rule. But it was a "consumer" rather than a "producer" city.

Regional exchanges between villages took place more often at fairs held in various villages than in towns. Until the British occupation, the towns of Cyprus were nothing less than sordid, with refuse in the streets and contaminated water supplies. They were frequently surrounded by marshes. By 1882, all towns had a supply of good water, drains of some kind and a garbage disposal system. The construction of roads and port facilities under the more effective British administration had the effect of centering intra-island regional exchanges on the towns, and also led to the mediation of external trade through towns rather than through village harbors, as had been the case previously.

The differential accumulation and concentration of capital and skills, and sometimes of social institutions, and their "lift pump" effect on other areas and populations, with the successive entry of different social strata into the nationalistic phase

Few and far between were the phenomena that might be termed as "a concentration of capital and skills." Centuries of neglect, maladministration, and the rapacious extractions of taxes for export by local officials stunted the growth of a Cypriot middle class.¹³ It was only with the advent of British colonialism, which fostered the creation of a capitalist-oriented society and the expansion of a merchant middle class, that Cyprus experienced a meaningful differential accumulation and concentration of capital, skills and social institutions. For example, it was from this new Greek urban middle class that new

¹³Hill, *History*, p. 573.

secular élites emerged and, directly or indirectly, began to challenge the hegemony of the Church in Greek Cypriot society and ultimately British political authority.¹⁴

It should also be noted that even prior to the capitalist phase of Cypriot development that differences in agricultural productivity between Christian and Muslim peasants were fairly pronounced. Notwithstanding the social, political and economic barriers placed before the Christian *rayas* by the Ottoman state, their productive predominance over the Muslim peasants is clear.¹⁵ These differences between the two populations were accelerated with the emergence of a Greek urban middle class. This class represented a new concentration of productive skills and knowledge and soon acquired a numerical and economic dominance over all the towns.

The rise of the concept of "interest" for both individuals and groups in unequal but fluid situations, and the growth of individual self-awareness and awareness of one's predispositions to join a particular group united by language and communication habits

The notion of interest implies a competitive situation or one of potential conflict in which individuals or groups attempt to maintain or improve their position against others. In non-group, traditional societies, which are also characterized by arbitrary rule, as well as legal and social inequalities, individuals will tend to form larger coalitions or networks in order to achieve economic and physical security. For this reason, thousands of Cypriot Christians converted to Islam. However, in time, conversions to Islam declined as the condition of Turkish Muslim peasants worsened and as the status of the Church of Cyprus improved. With which groups such coalitions can be found is by no means arbitrary. If they have a choice, they will tend to join a coalition united by language, cultural patterns, and communication habits.

The concept of "interest" and "the growth of individual self-awareness of one's predisposition to join a particular group united by language and communication habits" clearly emerged among the Greek Cypriots during the period of Ottoman domination.¹⁶ Indeed, the Turkish invasion of 1571 reversed the process of Latinization of the Cypriot population which had made some headway during the centuries of French and Venetian rule. While the restoration of the Church of

¹⁴Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven, 1977), pp. 11-12.

¹⁵Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data*, p. 108.

¹⁶For the application of the Deutch model to the Byzantine territorial political units existing during the whole or part of the period 1204-1453, see Stephen Xydis, "Medieval Origins of Modern Greek Nationalism," *Balkan Studies*, 9, 1 (Thessalonike, 1968) 1-20.

Cyprus to its former position of dominance by the Ottoman-Turks served the interests of the Ottoman state, it also reaffirmed the Hellenic-Byzantine culture of the Cypriots—a *sina qua non* for the emergence of Greek nationalism in Cyprus. By the end of the Greek revolution of 1821, the Church of Cyprus had become the most authoritative institution on the island and its archbishop recognized as Ethnarch—national leader or political spokesman of the Greek-Cypriot population. In the eyes of the Greek Cypriots the Church was not only the symbol of their ethnic and religious identities, but also their protector, albeit often ineffective, against maltreatment by local officials. Moreover, by preserving the legacy of the Hellenic-Byzantine civilization, the Church made it possible for the Greek Cypriots to identify with the mass of Greeks living under Ottoman-Turkish rule and subject to the administration or influence of the Church of Constantinople. The Church reinforced the linguistic and historical consciousness of the Christian Cypriots and strengthened their awareness as belonging to a single Greek race or *genos*.¹⁷

Of all the uniformities listed by Deutsch as prerequisites for the emergence of modern nationalism and national integration, only this one was fully present in Cyprus in 1821. But it must be qualified. While the Greek Cypriots identified with the Greek race, it was in the context of a Greek Christian Commonwealth and strongly influenced by the Byzantine universal ideal.

II

The introduction of reforms after 1839¹⁸ and the influence of the European consuls improved the conditions of the island and allowed a slow but steady economic and demographic recovery in the last years of Ottoman rule. By 1865 the value of exports exceeded £300,000, almost a three-fold increase over the value of exports in 1840,¹⁹ and the total population reached 170,000, an increase of almost 50% since

¹⁷D. A. Zakythinos, *The Making of Modern Greece* (Oxford, 1976), pp. 188-91. Historical awareness among the Greek Cypriots is suggested by the publication in 1788 of a history of Cyprus by Archimandrite Kyprianos—the first major work of its kind during the period of Turkish domination.

¹⁸The era of Tanzimat (1839-76) in Ottoman history was a period of sustained legislation and reform aimed at modernizing Ottoman state and society. It contributed to the further centralization of administration and brought increased state participation in Ottoman society. It sought to secure life and property of all its citizens and attempted to accord equality of treatment to all Ottoman subjects. It was not always successful. For the successes and failures of the Tanzimat or reform movement see *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2, by Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 55-171.

¹⁹De Cesnola (Larnaca) to the Department of State, February 19, 1886, Microcopy T 463, roll 2, NA.

1847.²⁰

Communications also improved. In 1863 a telegraph cable was installed between Cyprus and Syria, connecting the island with the Constantinople-Syria-Egypt line; and a main road was constructed between Larnaca and Nicosia.²¹ In addition, visits of merchant ships to the island's ports increased from 576 ships totalling 66,000 tons in 1857 to well over 1,000 ships totalling over 145,000 tons in 1865. And the foreign trade of Cyprus was further bolstered by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.²² Another important change in Cyprus was the growth of the Greek Cypriot merchant class. The European merchants of Larnaca no longer enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the island's foreign trade. Greek Cypriot merchants, protected by the capitulations of the European consulates and encouraged by the general improvement of the island's economy and administration, gradually took over a substantial portion of the growing internal and foreign trade of Cyprus.²³

The last years of Ottoman rule also marked the beginning of a slow but steady increase in the number and quality of Cypriot schools. In 1879, there were 66 Greek elementary schools with 69 teachers and 3,100 students; and 4 Greek secondary schools with 9 teachers and 113 students.²⁴ Until 1893, when the first permanent Greek gymnasium was established, if you wanted more than 7 years of schooling you had to leave the island. Most of the schools were established after 1840 and, needless to say, they became the cultural and national nurseries of the Greek Cypriot population, stimulating the national consciousness, as well as providing an education. Greek studies dominated the curriculum. Yet, it should be noted that until the British occupation of Cyprus, the overwhelming majority of the island's 700 villages were without schools.

Economic change and social mobilization in Cyprus during the last decades of Ottoman rule contributed to the growth of an élite Greek nationalism. Confined largely to the towns and supported by a wealthy class (outside of the Church) of landowners and merchants, Greek

²⁰Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data*, p. 73.

The introduction of vaccination for the control of smallpox and plague in the 1860s and the improved economic conditions, resulting in part, from an increased demand for Cyprus cotton by English interests (thanks to the American Civil War) largely accounted for the rapid population increase. See Barclay (Larnaca) to the Department of State, January 20, 1863, and de Cesnola (Larnaca) to the Department of State, January 20, 1886, Microcopy T 463, roll 2, NA.

²¹Barclay (Larnaca) to the Department of State, January 11, 1864, Microcopy T 463, roll 2, NA.

²²Barclay (Larnaca) to the Department of State, May 28, 1859 and de Cesnola (Larnaca) to the Department, February 19, 1866, June 10, 1866, Microcopy T 463, roll 2, NA.

²³Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data*, pp. 85, 88.

²⁴G. Chassiotis, *L'Instruction publique chez les Grecs* (Paris, 1881), pp. 504-05.

nationalism failed to penetrate the traditional society of the countryside, where the bulk of the Greek Cypriots lived. Indeed, as late as 1877, Greek consular reports complained that while the Greek feeling of the Christians of Cyprus was deep-rooted, it was never very pronounced.²⁵ It was not until the period of British rule that the preconditions emerged for the transformation of the élite Greek nationalism into a mass movement.²⁶

III

The conversion of nationalism of the Ottoman Greeks was at best gradual. Indeed, as late as the 1870s, among senior Ottoman officials there were to be found such eminent "Greek" figures as Karateodori Paşa (Alexander)—chief of the Ottoman delegation at the Congress of Berlin, Karateodori Paşa (Stefanos)—Ottoman Minister at Brussels, Musurus Paşa (Kostaki)—Ottoman Ambassador at London, and Fotiadis Bey—Ottoman Minister at Athens. For them, loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan and a sense of religious (Greek Orthodox) identity were more obvious alternatives than secular nationalist ideology.²⁷ Likewise, for the bulk of the "unredeemed" Greeks of the nineteenth century there was a sense of religious rather than national identity. Even as late as 1923, the blend of the secular and the religious, derived from an earlier period of Greek nationalism, was reflected in a large scale population exchange between Greece and Turkey. The effective criterion for the exchange was not language but the religious affiliation of the population, so that a sizeable Turkish-speaking, Greek Orthodox group (Karamanlis) was transferred to Greece and several Greek-speaking Muslim groups (particularly Muslims from Crete) were sent to Turkey.²⁸

The conflict between the universal (religious) and the national (secular) dimensions of the Greek policy known as the *Megali Idea* was largely dictated by geography, by the uneven growth of Greek national consciousness, and by the extent and timing of great power interference in the affairs of the Ottoman state. With the independence of the

²⁵Quoted in Evangelos Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Question 1875-1878* (Thessalonike, 1975), p. 39.

²⁶Adamantia Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy," *Comparative Politics*, 5, 4 (July, 1973) 575-600. See also Michael A. Attalides, "The Turkish Cypriots: Their Relations to the Greek Cypriots in Perspective," *Cyprus Review*, ed. Michael A. Attalides (Nicosia, 1977) 41-44.

²⁷A study of these Ottoman-Greek officials in the post Greek independence period is long overdue. It should provide further insight into the Ottoman imperial system and into the limitations of nationalist conversion among the Ottoman Greeks.

²⁸Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase* (Thessalonike, 1968) pp. 60-68.

truncated kingdom of Greece, the "unredeemed" Greeks of Crete, Thessaly, Epiros, Macedonia, the Ionian Islands, and of some of the Aegean islands looked upon Athens as the center of Hellenism and of a united Greece. On the other hand, the politically conscious "unredeemed" Greeks of Constantinople and Thrace, eastern Rumeli, Asia Minor, Pontos, and Cyprus, realizing that their own emancipation by means of revolution or war was highly improbable, opted for a policy of continued co-existence with the Ottoman Turks as the best course for their self-preservation as a community, and hoped that it would lead to their gradual ascendance within the Ottoman state. Constantinople remained for them and their less politically conscious brethren the center of Hellenism and the focus of a Greek Christian Commonwealth.

The division of Western and Eastern Hellenism was not absolute, and partisans of opposing views were to be found in each of the camps. Nor were their positions entirely incompatible, at least in times of peace. In such times, many Greeks, whenever they could, worked for the economic, social, and educational advancement of their people. However, in times of tension, revolution, and war, unity weakened and there was often much bitterness and mutual recrimination, although common ideals prevented an open clash between the two centers of Hellenism—Athens and Constantinople. It was the abstention from violence that set apart the devotees of Eastern Hellenism from the Athens-inspired "unredeemed" Greeks who, with varying degrees of competence, possessed the opportunity, the means, and the will to challenge the rule of the Ottoman Turks.²⁹

During the reign of Otho I of Greece (1832-63), there was little to

²⁹Kofos, *Greece*, pp. 17-21, 33-41; Great Britain, *Foreign Office* 327, 20 (29 October, 1866).

There is a striking similarity in the relationship between Athens and Constantinople in the nineteenth century and between Athens and Nicosia in our time. In the nineteenth century Athens not only claimed to be the center of Hellenism but also frequently accused the Constantinople-oriented Greeks and, particularly, the Ecumenical Patriarch of being self-seeking, pro-Russian or pro-Turkish and, therefore, anti-Greek. In fact, they were none of these. As one of the patriarchs, Joachim II, explained to the Greek foreign office—his sole aim was the pursuit of Hellenism, but he had necessarily to hold on to a precarious throne and found himself torn between intransigent parties in his efforts to protect his flock. What he should have added was that his duty to protect his flock was not always compatible with his duty toward Hellenism, as interpreted by Athens. His predicament was not always appreciated in Greece, where many tended to demand more of him than was possible for him to accomplish. In our time, at least until 1974, Athens had insisted, in its dialogue with Nicosia, that it was the center of Hellenism; and had frequently accused the late Archbishop Makarios of being self-seeking, pro-Soviet Union, and a traitor to the cause of Hellenism. He was clearly none of these. In response to his detractors, Makarios could rightly have evoked the identical explanation of Patriarch Joachim II to the Greek foreign office delivered well over a century ago.

attract the Greek Cypriots to the Greek kingdom.³⁰ Their political, commercial, and cultural contacts were overwhelmingly directed toward Constantinople and nearby Ottoman territories. The Ecumenical Patriarchate continued to serve as mediator in the affairs of the Church of Cyprus, to help train its clergy, and to assist the frequent deputations of Cypriots to the Porte seeking to fix the annual tribute, economic relief, and administrative reform. The Ecumenical Patriarchate also took the lead in establishing educational and cultural associations (sylogoi) which assumed the responsibility for founding and financing Greek schools throughout the Ottoman Empire, including Cyprus.³¹ Economic and cultural ties with the Greek communities of Constantinople, Smyrna, and Alexandria were stronger than those with Athens. Indeed, despite the steady growth of Athens in commercial importance in the second half of the century, Constantinople remained until the end of the century the center of the Greek mercantile world.³² Finally, the extremely low profile of Greek nationalism in Cyprus was also due to its proximity to the Anatolian mainland and to its remoteness from Athens. Moreover, the ruling Muslim élite in Cyprus enjoyed a monopoly of coercive power.³³

However, Greece began to exert a greater attraction for the "unredeemed" Greeks, including the Greek Cypriots, during the reign of George I (1864-1913). Athens began to acquire a new social unity, and the tempo of cultural and economic life heightened dramatically. With the union of the Ionian islands with Greece in 1864, the quite impressive cultural élite that had developed there was absorbed by the kingdom's growing center. Because Athens offered the most centralized structure of modern Hellenism, Greeks from the diaspora began to converge on it in large numbers. The annexation of Thessaly by Greece in 1881 further reinforced the attraction of Athens as the center of Hellenism. The population of the country increased from 750,000 in 1830 to 1,750,000 in 1880, and by 1907, it had reached

³⁰Harry J. Psomiades, "The Character of the New Greek State," *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change*, ed. N. Diamandourous et al (Thessalonike, 1976) 147-55.

³¹Christos C. Doulas, "History and the Cyprus Problem," *Social Science*, 43, 3 (1968) 148; and Speros Vyronis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1971), p. 459.

³²Barclay (Larnaca) to the Department of State, September 12, 1859, Microcopy T 463, roll 2, NA; and John C. Campbell and Philip Sherrard, *Modern Greece* (London, 1968) p. 93.

³³D. E. Lee, "A Memorandum Concerning Cyprus," *Journal of Modern History* (June, 1931) 236-41. Yiannis Katsouras, "Old Limassol and its Cultural Activities," 27, 4-5 (July-Oct., 1979) 14.

2,600,000. The old private school that once monopolized Greek education gave way to the modern public schools. In 1837 a university was founded in Athens which by the 1860s had become a major attraction for the Greeks of the Ottoman state who were experiencing a fairly rapid process of urbanization.

In 1834 the site of Piraeus, the port of Athens, was marked by a single building, but by the turn of the century it had become one of the busiest ports of the Mediterranean. Metropolitan Athens and Piraeus, which had a population of 10,000 in 1830, had surpassed the 200,000 mark by 1900. Nearly 170 kilometers of paved roads were built between 1828 and 1852, 610 kilometers between 1867 and 1880, and 2,128 kilometers between 1880 and 1909. In 1869 the first railway was built connecting Athens and Piraeus. Between 1869 and 1909, 1,614 kilometers of railroads were constructed. In 1893 the Corinth Canal between the Peloponnesian peninsula and the mainland was opened. The Greek merchant marine increased from 1,241 tons of steamships in 1875 to 144,975 tons in 1895. In 1915 it rose to 893,650 tons.³⁴ All of the above, along with the increasing political and cultural predominance of Athens in the Greek world, led to a compact communication network that hardly existed before.³⁵

The increasing importance of the Greek state to the "unredeemed" Greeks was also due to the contraction of patriarchal power and authority, especially when the autocephalous Church of Greece and the Bulgarian Exarchate were set up in 1850 and 1870 respectively. By the turn of the century the power of the Ecumenical Patriarchate had been further diminished by the emergence of Turkish nationalism which itself had been greatly stimulated by the nationalism of modern Greece and of the other Balkan states that had managed to break away from the Ottoman Empire at various times since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thus, more and more Ottoman Greeks began to look toward Athens rather than toward Constantinople for political support in the improvement of their status. However, while the new Greek nation-state became a base of revolutionary activity among the Greeks who were still under Ottoman rule, clearly this hardly included the Greeks of Thrace, Anatolia, and Cyprus. The irredentist priorities of Greek foreign policy were primarily directed toward Crete, Macedonia, Epiros, and the Aegean islands.³⁶

³⁴Harry J. Psomiades, "The Economic and Social Transformation of Modern Greece," *Journal of International Affairs*, 19, 2 (1965) 195-96.

³⁵Stephen G. Xydis, "Modern Greek Nationalism," *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle, 1969) 240.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 235-43; and Psomiades, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 18-22.

IV

The occupation of Cyprus by Britain in 1878 had a two-fold impact on the development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus. It brought about a major shift in the political orientation of the Cypriots from Constantinople to Athens, and it hastened the growth of Greek Cypriot nationalism into a mass movement.

To the factors contributing to the shift from Constantinople to Athens, mentioned earlier, must be added those that had a direct bearing on British rule in Cyprus. First of all, because the Greek Cypriots no longer had to deal with Constantinople, they no longer needed the Ecumenical Patriarchate to intercede on their behalf with the Ottoman authorities and were thus free to strengthen their ties with Western Hellenism. Secondly, because Britain was also a 'protecting power' of Greece, the Greek Cypriots believed that Athens had influence with London and could intercede on their behalf in the pursuit of *enosis*—the union of Cyprus with Greece. If Britain could turn over the Ionian islands to Greece (1864), why not Cyprus!

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in depth Britain's unwitting contribution to Greek Cypriot nationalism as a mass movement. Briefly, what occurred was as follows. Britain's attempt to undermine the traditional authority of the Church of Cyprus and to deny it political influence merely served to strengthen its role, in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots, as the national guardian of Cypriot Hellenism. Consequently, the Church came to symbolize resistance to British rule as it had previously to Ottoman rule. With its enormous resources, the Church leadership once again took on the responsibility of uniting the Greek Cypriots into a dynamic social movement transcending class distinctions. A primary source of discontent was the continued collection of the Turkish Tribute of £93,800 annually. The money was not reinvested in Cyprus but collected from the Cypriots to service the Ottoman Turkish debt of 1855. It went into the pockets of British shareholders. The process of modernization (economic change and social mobilization) as well as the decision by the British to rule Cyprus on a communal basis during the period of their rule (1878-1960), particularly after World War II, became the *sine qua non* for the politicization of the Greek Cypriot masses. The results were the rapid spread of literacy and the proliferation of Greek schools, including a significant increase of teachers from Greece; an educational system that linked the rapidly growing Greek Cypriot middle class with the Greek state; greater mobility through better transportation and improved communication; the proliferation of Greek Cypriot newspapers, magazines, journals and books, as well as an increase in voluntary cultural, religious and economic organizations and institutions; improved health

conditions and the decline in the death rate; the urbanization of Cyprus and the widespread entry of Greek Cypriots into the professions and commerce. The nature of British rule, based on ethnic and religious communities and political inequality for the Greek Cypriots, not only contributed to the cause of Greek nationalism but, in the long run, served to widen the gap between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Operating ostensibly within the existing traditional framework, British policy, in area after area—political, educational and judicial—"sharpened the division between Muslim and Orthodox communities, extended their regulation and control over their members, redefined them in terms of nationalities, and located them within a modern political context."³⁷

³⁷Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict," 600.