

### **Cyprus before the Storm: The Kennedy Years, 1961-1963**

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...The most powerful single force in the world today is neither communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile, it is man's eternal desire to be free and independent. The great enemy of that tremendous force of freedom is called...imperialism... Thus the single most important test of American foreign policy today is how to meet the challenge of imperialism, what we do to further man's desire to be free. On this test more than any other, this Nation shall be critically judged by the uncommitted millions in Asia and Africa.<sup>1</sup>

*John F. Kennedy, July 2, 1957*

Christmas of 1963 found Cyprus in an unsettled state of affairs. On December 21, violence erupted in the capital Nicosia between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and quickly spread throughout the island. During the period between December 1963 and August 1964, on several occasions, Greece and Turkey came close to war over Cyprus, while the United States tried hard to avert such an eventuality. In the United States itself, the country was still in deep shock in Christmas 1963. It was only a few weeks earlier, on November 22, that President Kennedy was assassinated, an event that left America traumatized for a generation. And it

was only five days after Kennedy's funeral that the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, submitted, on November 30, 1963, his proposals to amend the Cypriot constitution, a development that was followed by the bloody Greek-Turkish clashes three weeks later.

Certainly, in the largest scheme of things, a crisis in a far away island in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, in Christmas of 1963, would have been irrelevant as far as America was concerned, especially at a time when it was pre-occupied with its own deep domestic wound, the assassination of President Kennedy. This would have been the case, the irrelevance of Cyprus, had it not been for the fact that the island republic occupied a crucial geostrategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean, serving as a stepping stone to the Middle East. Given the Soviet-American rivalry in an area, where vital American interests were at stake, the United States was compelled to become deeply involved in the 1963-64 crises. At the time, the paramount concern of the new Johnson administration was that the Soviet Union might be tempted to take advantage of America's preoccupation with the tragedy of the Kennedy assassination, especially when it came to strategically important areas around the globe. One such area was the Eastern Mediterranean. The American concern was that the Cyprus crisis in Christmas 1963 and its poisonous effect on Greek-Turkish relations could provide a good opportunity for the Soviet Union to gain foothold on Cyprus while driving a wedge between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

There have been several high ranking American officials who dealt with repeated crises over Cyprus and Greek-Turkish crises in general, since the Cyprus issue erupted in the international arena in the 1950s. Since then, the Cyprus dispute was added to the other two international disputes that remained intractable, the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From that time onward, from the 1950s and until the present, several American presidents were confronted with the Cyprus dispute and its ramifications. Some of them became directly involved with Cyprus, because several crises on the island threatened a Greek-Turkish confrontation that would have led to the collapse of NATO's southeastern flank. The beneficiary of such an eventuality would have been the Soviet Union—this up until 1991 when the Russian empire collapsed. Among those who became personally involved with Cyprus was President Kennedy. This is noteworthy considering that during his brief presidency there been no major crisis over Cyprus. Indeed, President Kennedy did not have to deal with an acute Cyprus crisis associated with a Graeco-Turkish crisis for that matter, like those that confronted several of his successors, including Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Clinton. Perhaps, that is why little has been written about the Kennedy presidency and Cyprus.

On the part of Cyprus, the leader who dominated the political scene as repeated crises unfolded and had to deal with several American presidents, including Kennedy, was Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus from the time of its independence in 1960 until his death in 1977.

#### **THE ROOTS OF THE 1963 CYPRUS CRISIS**

The eruption of ethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus in Christmas 1963 was mainly an outgrowth of the Zurich-London Agreements establishing the Republic of Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> The first part of the Agreements (Part A) was entitled "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus," and was comprised of 27 articles. These articles defined the powers of the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government, the specific authority of each branch and the distribution of power between Greeks and Turks within each government branch.<sup>3</sup> In addition, Article 21 provided for the establishment of a Treaty of Guarantee among Cyprus,

Greece, Britain and Turkey and a Treaty of Military Alliance among Cyprus, Greece and Turkey with the provision that these two Agreements will be part of the Constitution. The last provision of the Agreements, Article 27, provided:

All the above points [the Articles in the Agreement] shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.

These 27 Articles of the Zurich-London Agreement, defined as basic articles of the constitution, could not be amended. Thus, from its inception, the Republic of Cyprus was placed in a constitutional straightjacket.

The agreements establishing Cyprus' independence were signed in London on February 19, 1959, following a four year guerrilla campaign against British colonial rule (1955-1959). It was carried out by EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), which enjoyed overwhelming popular support and was under the political leadership of Archbishop Makarios, the ethnarch, and the military leadership of George Grivas-Dhigenis.<sup>4</sup>

EOKA's objective was self-determination leading to *enosis* (union) with Greece. The signatories of the London Agreements included Archbishop Makarios, representing the Greek majority population of Cyprus (80%), Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, representing the Turkish minority population (18%), the British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, the Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and the Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes. The agreements were most unique as far as the de-colonization process was concerned. A fundamental objective of this process that swept the Middle East, Africa and Asia from the late 1940s to the mid 1960s had been the removal of colonial authority and the dominant role foreign powers played in the colonies. In the case of Cyprus, a British colony, the agreements establishing its independence from Britain had no precedent in the post-colonial era as they included provisions granting

such rights to external powers, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, that in essence established a quasi-protectorate. Through the Treaty of Guarantee, these three powers became the "guarantor powers" of Cyprus' independence and had the right of military intervention on the island, jointly or unilaterally.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, through the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey stationed military contingents on Cyprus.

The Zurich-London Agreements incorporated a provision through which England secured for itself two huge military bases, covering 2.7 percent of the island's territory. As such, these bases were granted the status of British sovereign territory in perpetuity. Britain also enjoyed other privileges such as rights to have unfettered access to the island's roads and transportation system, to carry out military maneuvers and to have communication, radar and logistical facilities in various parts of the island. Such privileges to foreign powers, including the former colonial master, Britain, coming at a time when the winds of freedom from colonial rule were sweeping the world, were unheard of. In the final analysis, Cyprus was granted the most curtailed sovereignty compared to any other newly emancipated country. No newly independent country in Africa or Asia was saddled with such an onerous burden. The American University's publication, *Cyprus: A Country Study*, which is part of its Foreign Area Studies that are also used for the training of American diplomats, put this way the role of foreign powers:

The (Zurich-London) agreements clearly indicated that the theme of external forces as a dominant influence on Cypriot affairs was to be carried forward from the colonial period into independence.<sup>6</sup>

The semi-independent status of Cyprus was accompanied by a Constitution that had no precedent in the post-Second World War constitutional history. It was a highly divisive document based on rigid bi-communalism that incorporated a minority veto power and ethno-religious quotas

for the three branches of government and at all their levels. Again, according to *Cyprus: A Country Study*:

The outline for the constitution provided elaborate safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot community in the form of veto powers and secured quotas in all branches of government, Public Service, and the armed forces. *The minority quotas far exceeded the actual proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the population.*<sup>7</sup> (Emphasis added)

Among others, the Cypriot Constitution granted a veto power to the Vice President of the Republic, who had to be Turkish Cypriot. Likewise, in the legislative branch, ethnic division was institutionalized, since each ethnic group elected its representatives from within the group in separate elections. Greeks elected their Greek representatives while Turks elected theirs. In addition, the Turkish Cypriot members of the legislature had the right to veto any major bill. A quota system permeated the state bureaucracy, the public service and all government agencies. This quota system was based on ethnicity and provided for a ratio of 70 percent Greek to 30 percent Turkish representation throughout the state's administrative system.

Considering that the Turks were 18 percent of the population and the Greeks represented 80 percent, the granting of an omnibus veto power to the minority population, along with an ethnicity-based quota system, were not conducive to promoting a dynamic towards consociational politics and inter-ethnic accommodation.<sup>8</sup> Rather, the philosophy and mechanisms of the Zurich-London Agreements, instead of upholding majority rule while fully protecting the legitimate rights of the minority as is the norm in western democracies, resulted instead in the institutionalization of ethnic division that reduced politics to a zero-sum game. In the end, the Cypriot Constitution was the antithesis of checks and bal-

ances. The minority veto power and the quota system injected permanent imbalances that inexorably became a source of ethnic friction that led to government paralysis and to inevitable constitutional collapse.

Given these fundamental flaws of the Cypriot Constitution, and as independence came, the two communities had to navigate, politically speaking, in a sea of residual mistrust that existed since the time of the EOKA campaign. British policies played an instrumental role in fomenting this mistrust. Indeed, Britain, faced with the challenge of EOKA, fomented ethnic conflict between Greek and Turk, by resorting to the policy of "divide and rule." This policy was carried out in the background of bitter historical memories of the two peoples and the conflicting nationalisms, the Greek and the Turkish. Accordingly, on the diplomatic front, Britain encouraged Turkey to become involved in the Cyprus dispute while it promoted the idea of the island's partition. Subsequently, the Turkish side adopted *taksim* (partition) as antidote to *enosis*. On the ground, the British colonial authorities adopted a series of measures that inexorably led to inter-communal conflict.<sup>9</sup> This colonial tactic, aimed at forcing EOKA to fight on two fronts, included the establishment of a special police force manned exclusively by Turkish Cypriots.<sup>10</sup> This special police unit came to the aid of British security forces that had been trying to suppress the popular movement that was behind EOKA. This led to inevitable Turkish violence against the Greek population. It should be noted in this regard, that when EOKA was planning its anti-British campaign and as a matter of policy, when the guerrilla campaign started in April 1955, had no intention of harming the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>11</sup> This was particularly the case since Greek and Turkish Cypriots coexisted peacefully on the island. However, when Turkish violence against Greeks began, EOKA was forced to retaliate in self-defense. Thus, during 1957 and especially in 1958, serious inter-com-

munal strife took place, creating great animosity between Greeks and Turks on the island, with the Turkish Cypriot leadership siding squarely with the British colonial administration and its repressive measures.<sup>12</sup> This inter-communal conflict dynamited the peaceful coexistence between Greeks and Turks who lived mostly in mixed villages and towns and cities throughout Cyprus.

In an atmosphere of ethnic tension and Greek-Turkish violence around the island, the Anglo-Turkish notion of partition sounded less unpalatable, while it gave greater urgency to settle the Cyprus dispute once and for all. It was this fear of partition that primarily prompted Makarios and the Greek government to accept, instead of self-determination, the independence of Cyprus, and make the subsequent painful concessions evident in the Zurich-London Agreements.

In such poisonous environment in the immediate aftermath of independence, the Constitution and its rigidity with quota systems and veto powers at every step proved unworkable almost from the very beginning.<sup>13</sup> Shortly after the signing of the Zurich-London Agreements, the U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared a report casting serious doubt as to the viability of the Cypriot Constitution.<sup>14</sup> A noted British author wrote about the predicament Cyprus found itself in 1960:

Although Cyprus was about to become an independent Republic, it was a form of independence without a state.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, barely seven months after independence, by March 31, 1961, Cyprus was left without income tax legislation. According to the Constitution, the enactment of legislation in the House of Representatives (consisting of 35 Greek members and 15 Turkish members), required separate Greek and Turkish majorities on important issues such as the imposition of duties and taxes. Taxation of course, is a most fundamen-

tal function of any government. The American Revolution was ignited over the unfair taxation by the British colonial authorities. In the case of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives had a veto power over taxation. When the government of Archbishop Makarios introduced legislation to extend the existing income tax law for three months and until March 31, 1961, twenty-five Greek members of the House of Representatives voted for it, while eleven Turkish members rejected it. These eleven votes, however, carried more weight than the twenty-five votes because the Constitution required separate Greek and Turkish majorities for tax legislation to pass. This was tantamount to a minority veto power in the legislature, and as consequence, Cyprus had no income tax legislation. A final effort to pass such legislation a few months later failed, and by December 18, 1961, the government could neither impose nor collect new taxes.<sup>16</sup>

Earlier, on October 20, 1961, Vice President Fazil Kuchuk used his veto power and blocked the Council of Minister's decision to create a mixed army. By March 1962, the two sides were in total disagreement regarding the establishment of separate municipalities in the five largest towns, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos. President Makarios viewed the establishment of separate municipalities in these mixed towns as a prelude to geographical partition and suggested the maintenance of a united municipal authority with proportional representation of Greeks and Turks. Vice President Kuchuk insisted that "geographical partition of municipalities could be brought about."<sup>17</sup> These and several other constitutional disagreements were leading to an increasingly dysfunctional government. As a consequence, President Makarios, from an early stage, was led to the decision to seek the amendment of the Constitution. This was on his mind already by January 1962, following the Turkish Cypriot veto of the income tax legislation. Less than

two years later, on November 30, 1963, and as one constitutional impasse followed another, Makarios proceeded and proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution.

### KENNEDY'S INTEREST IN CYPRUS

By the time the State Department was making preparations for Makarios' visit to Washington in June 1962, the constitutional impasse that was looming in Cyprus was well known to American policy makers. Diplomatic dispatches to the state Department from the American Embassies in Nicosia and London, discussed at length the ongoing constitutional problems in Cyprus and Makarios' desire to seek amendments to the Constitution.<sup>18</sup> Following Makarios' visit to Washington, several dispatches from the American Ambassador in Nicosia, Fraser Wilkins, as well as dispatches from the American Embassies in London and Athens, discussed the constitutional tension areas and the intensification of Makarios' efforts to seek the amending of the Constitution. The question American diplomats were asking was whether Makarios was indeed determined to proceed to propose the amending of the constitution.<sup>19</sup>

When President Makarios arrived in Washington on June 5, 1962, he was received with great honor and cordiality by President Kennedy. This was not the first time they met, however. Kennedy had first met Makarios in 1957 when he was a Massachusetts senator. Makarios had visited Boston in September 1957 during a campaign he undertook to advance the Cyprus cause in the United States. In this vein, he met Senator John F. Kennedy in Boston and asked for his support in the struggle of the people of Cyprus for self-determination. Senator Kennedy had expressed on many occasions, both in speeches before the Senate and other fora, his support for Cyprus' struggle for self-determination and *enosis* (union) with Greece.<sup>20</sup> Senator Kennedy saw such a principled American stand in support of self-determination,

the main objective of anti-colonial movements, as a moral obligation of Americans as well as a barrier against Soviet exploitation of the anti-colonial winds that were sweeping the Middle East and North Africa. Kennedy's opposition to western imperialism and his sympathetic view of anti-colonial movements around the globe, were made in full awareness of the displeasure that this might cause to the great colonial powers Britain and France as well. For instance, in a June 1956 at Kansas City, Missouri, and at a time when both Cyprus and Algeria were engaged in a violent struggle against British and French colonialism respectively, Senator Kennedy declared:

...We fight to keep the world free from Communist imperialism - but in doing so we hamper our efforts, and bring suspicion upon our motives, by being closely linked with Western imperialism. We want - indeed we desperately need, if the deterrent power of our Strategic Air Command is to have any meaning - to maintain Western bases in Cyprus, in North Africa and in all the other areas around the borders of the Soviet Union - and yet we stand to lose those bases if the Communists are able to captivate the nationalistic movements that seek to drive out all vestiges of Western domination. We have permitted the reputation of the United States as a friend of oppressed people, in short, to be hitched to the chariot of the conqueror; because we have believed we could have it both ways.

...Of course such a stand will displease our allies - but it will displease the Soviets even more. For whether our allies like it or not, and whether they act to impede it or not, sooner or later, one by one, the traditional colonies of the Western powers are breaking free. The primary question is whether they will then turn for association and support to

the West—which has thus far too often hampered and discouraged their efforts for self determination - or turn to the Communist East - which has (however hypocritically, in view of its own colonial exploitation) inflamed their nationalistic spirits and assumed the role of freedom's defender. I emphasize again that I do not fail to appreciate the difficulties of our hard pressed Allies - but I feel that their present colonial policies only serve to make easier the way of the Communist transgressor.<sup>21</sup>

In this, and many other speeches around the country, Senator John F. Kennedy condemned western colonialism in unequivocal terms and supported the anti-colonial movements seeking self-determination, and this included Cyprus as well. However, the speech that received wide publicity in the United States, while it resonated around the world and won the hearts of the peoples of Africa and Asia who were fighting western colonialism, was the one Senator John F. Kennedy gave at the Senate Chamber on July 2, 1957. Entitled "Imperialism, the Enemy of Freedom," the speech became known as the "Algeria Speech" because Kennedy dealt at great length with the question of Algeria. In this speech, Kennedy gave the most eloquent treatise by a U.S. Senator of that generation against colonial rule and in defense of freedom and the principle of self determination. He launched a scathing criticism of French colonial policies in Algeria, supported the nationalist movement seeking independence from France and also strongly criticized the policy of the Eisenhower administration which appeared to make America a de facto accomplice of France in Algeria. He gave a sober warning to the American foreign policy establishment that failure to oppose western imperialism and stand by the side of the nationalist movements around the world seek-

ing independence, will only benefit the Soviet Union that was ready to exploit the winds blowing against colonialism in Africa and Asia. Then, Kennedy went on to admonish the American people to stand in solidarity with the peoples of the world fighting western colonialism as follows:

If we are to secure the friendship of the Arab, the African, and the Asian—and we must, despite what Mr. Dulles says about our not being a popularity contest—we cannot hope to accomplish it solely by means of billion-dollar foreign aid programs. We cannot win their hearts by making them dependent on our handouts. Nor can we keep them free by selling them free enterprise, by describing the perils of communism or the prosperity of the United States, or limiting our dealings to military pacts. No, the strength of our appeal to these key populations—and it is rightfully our appeal, and not that of the communists—lie in our traditional and deeply felt philosophy of freedom and independence for all people everywhere.<sup>22</sup>

Kennedy's Algeria speech revealed the profound understanding by the young Senator from Massachusetts of the plight of the oppressed peoples of Africa and Asia on the one hand and the inevitability of their victory over colonialism on the other, something that the American foreign policy establishment was slow to grasp. Hence, this establishment, from the John Foster Dulles' State Department, to influential Democratic figures such as Dean Acheson and Adlai Stevenson, expressed strong opposition to Kennedy's Algeria speech. As for the French government, it expressed outrage.

It did not take long for Kennedy to be thoroughly vindicated. By the time he became president, the British, French, Belgian and Dutch colonialism had all but collapsed, with the

exception of Portuguese possessions in Africa. Essentially, the Kennedy administration was faced with a new world compared to the one President Eisenhower faced when he was re-elected President in 1956. It was a world with colonialism in total retreat and with newly independent countries in Africa and Asia attempting to govern themselves. What had not changed was the challenge of the Soviet Union and the cold war that was being waged globally. This cold war, however, was to be waged also in the terrain of the newly independent countries known as the Third World.

Within this new international environment, Kennedy's foreign policy followed a two track line: Promotion of democracy, freedom, and social and economic justice around the globe and the Third World especially, while at the same time standing up and confronting with resolute the global threat of Soviet communism. The latter policy was to be carried out in the context of the need for slowing down the nuclear arms race.

From the very beginning, President Kennedy and his administration acknowledged the new international dynamic following the triumph of anti-colonial movements that led the great majority of the newly independent countries form the Non-aligned Movement. The United States undertook a global campaign to assist in the development of these countries. They were also faced with challenges to their ethnic cohesion, to a great extent a legacy of colonial rule that created artificial borders and also fomented ethnic, tribal or religious tensions. This colonial predicament in the Third World, and above all, poverty and under-development, offered a fertile ground for communist movements to grow, and by extension, gave the Soviet Union an opportunity to make inroads into Africa and Asia. The establishment the Peace Corps, one of the first actions taken by the new president in March 1961, was among the greatest achievements of John Kennedy. The Peace Corps were the result of his

idealism and a vision of America coming to the aid of those who fought colonialism, achieved their freedom but were struggling to stand on their feet. Thousands of Peace Corps volunteers, inspired by President Kennedy's idealism, travelled to Third World countries in order to help local communities in a variety of projects, ranging from agriculture, to education, to health care, to transportation, to energy, to urban planning. In Kennedy's mind, the Peace Corps was an antidote to the Soviet effort to expand its influence in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.<sup>23</sup>

#### **MAKARIOS, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND COMMUNISM**

Considering the emergence of the Non-aligned Movement as an important force in the international arena during the Kennedy era on the one hand and the Soviet-American rivalry in the Third World on the other, it is important to ponder over Makarios' view of non-alignment and his attitude and policies towards communism.

Makarios emerged as one the Third World leaders since the time he attended the Bandung Conference in Indonesia (April 18-24, 1955) that led to the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement. The EOKA campaign against the British, which had commenced only two weeks before the Bandung Conference, captured the sympathy of world opinion from the Middle East, to Africa and Asia and also attracted widespread attention in the West. In the Unites States, Greek Americans formed a Committee for the Self-Determination of Cyprus and engaged in a variety of activities, mainly in an effort to inform public opinion and influence Congress to support Cyprus' struggle against British colonial rule. It was in this vein that Makarios visited the United States in September 1957, when he first met John Kennedy, then Massachusetts Senator. By the time Cyprus became independent in 1960, Makarios had emerged as an

important figure of the non-Aligned Movement along with Nehru of India, Soekarno of Indonesia, Nasser of Egypt, Tito of Yugoslavia, Ben Bella of Algeria, Nkrumah of Ghana and Nyerere of Tanzania. In this regard, Makarios' international fame exceeded by far the size of the little island republic, Cyprus.<sup>24</sup> The Non-aligned Movement, however, became entangled in the cold war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially since Moscow was able to exploit developments in the Third World to its advantage.

Makarios did not see the Non-aligned Movement as means to distance Cyprus from the West. He saw it, rather, as natural by-product of the emancipation struggle from the colonial yoke, for which struggle he himself was a powerful symbol. Indeed, Makarios saw the Non-aligned Movement as a legitimate actor in the international arena, a force representing and empowering all those who had been oppressed for so long and who have found a voice of their own in world affairs. It was to be a voice, at least theoretically, that was not subservient to the superpowers, the United States or the Soviet Union. Of course, on its part, Moscow saw the Non-aligned Movement as a vehicle to extend its influence in the Third World by exploiting the widespread anti-colonial sentiment, poverty and socio-economic ills on the one hand while exploiting national rivalries, such as Greek and Turkish or Arab and Israeli, on the other.

When Makarios was elected President of Cyprus on December 13, 1959, he combined the office of the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus with the secular office of the President of the Republic. Being a Greek Orthodox religious leader, Makarios had no sympathy to atheist Marxism which, among others, considered religion as "the opium of the people" and aimed at abolishing private property rights. Makarios was conscious of the systematic persecution of the Church in Russia and the rest of the communist bloc. As it transpired, at the time of

independence, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, especially its monasteries, was the largest land and property owner in the island and also had major share in a variety of economic ventures including mines and banks. As such, the Church was the single most powerful economic institution at the time of independence and its aftermath. Combined to its economic power was the fact that the Church was legitimized as a vital institution that dominated Cyprus' political life. The Church's political role derived from the practices of the Ottomans who ruled Cyprus for three centuries (1571-1878). Under the Ottoman *millet* system, the head of the Church, in this case the Archbishop, was also the spokesman for his *millet*, religious group, who represented his Greek Orthodox flock at the Sublime Port in Constantinople. Thus, the Cypriot Archbishop emerged as the ethnarch, the political leader of the Christian Greek population of Cyprus.

When the British took over Cyprus in 1878 and thereafter, the Church and the Archbishop-ethnarch, became the dominant political institution that led the anti-colonial movement. Thus, Makarios' political authority after independence was characterized by extraordinary legitimacy. When he was elected President of the Republic in December 1959, he carried with him the traditional authority of the religious leader and ethnarch of the Greek population. In addition, Makarios' authority was sanctioned by democratic elections in which he won the great majority of the vote. He was also a charismatic leader and his charisma only reinforced his authority and unprecedented popular support.<sup>25</sup> In this regard, Makarios popular following extended beyond Cyprus and reached Greece proper. There were periods during the EOKA campaign that Makarios' popularity in Greece was such that his word was more authoritative than that of any Greek leader.

Following independence and given the historically dominant political and economic role of the Church in Cypriot society, it would have been self-defeating for the Church

and its leadership to be sympathetic to communism as a socio-political system. There was certainly a strong communist movement in Cyprus, organized under the umbrella of a political party, AKEL.<sup>26</sup> As such, Cypriot communists were the most cohesive political formation in Cyprus when independence came. Yet, their role was limited when it came to charting the path for newly independent Cyprus. A major characteristic of Cypriot communism was the lack of revolutionary zeal compared to other communist movements.<sup>27</sup> AKEL's communism in Cyprus was *sui generis* as it existed in parallel with the Church and it was not uncommon to see members of AKEL to be regular church goers. When independence came in 1960, Cyprus' indigenous communists did not call for any kind of radical or revolutionary action that would have threatened the bourgeois system represented by the Church, the commercial class and the traditional rural Cypriot society. AKEL, however, defended and pressed for worker's rights and it this role that rendered it an important social force. Furthermore, AKEL, favored and worked diligently to promote cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, based on the solidarity of the working class of the two communities. All these did not mean that there has been no right-left rivalry in Cyprus. Indeed, from the very beginning since AKEL was established in 1941, there was strong opposition to it by the nationalists and the church oriented circles that were pursuing *enosis* with Greece, an ideology that was espoused by the overwhelming majority of the Greek population. In fact, there were periods, especially in the 1940s, when AKEL was also an advocate of *enosis*.<sup>28</sup> Certainly, political freedoms and activities were seriously curtailed under British rule. But to the extent that there was political life in Cyprus in the form of parties competing for local offices, like city councils and mayoralities, there was a clear right-left ideological competition between nationalists and communists. But this competitive spirit between right

and left never reached the acrimony and bitterness that characterized the Greek right and left.<sup>29</sup>

In the final analysis, Cypriot communism was not competing for power after independence and in order to bring about the revolutionary or radical transformation of Cypriot society. Even for AKEL ideologues who spoke of a "classless society," such talk was more of a dream rather than a realistic pursuit. As it transpired, the Cypriot communist movement was, by and large, deprived of its potential to seriously influence developments in the immediate aftermath of Cyprus' independence because AKEL did not participate in the EOKA-led anti-colonial national liberation struggle of 1955-1959. In fact, AKEL rejected EOKA's violent campaign against British colonial rule. According to AKEL's Central Committee decision, "the tactic of armed struggle is a tactic out of place and time, it is utopian and condemned to failure."<sup>30</sup> There were, however, some former cadres of AKEL who denounced the party for not taking part in the EOKA liberation struggle against "imperialism."<sup>31</sup> As in the case of some other communist parties, such as the Iranian Tudeh, AKEL was hesitant to embrace the tactic of armed struggle. Like Tudeh, AKEL considered the non-violent mass mobilization of workers and a coalition of "progressive forces" as the best means to oppose oppressive rule, the Shah in the case of Iran, and British colonialism when it came to Cyprus. In the case of Iran, Tudeh considered the resorting to armed struggle by the two major guerrilla groups, the Marxist Fedayeen Khalq and the Islamo-Marxist Mujahedin Khalq, as premature.<sup>32</sup> Likewise, in the case of Cyprus, AKEL considered the EOKA campaign as unsuitable method of struggle towards national liberation. This, in contrast to the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) that embraced armed struggle as a means to gain power in the aftermath of the Second World War.

This negative position of AKEL towards EOKA's violent

anti-colonial campaign was a most critical factor that rendered AKEL unable to become a key political player when Cyprus became independent in 1960.<sup>33</sup> Considering that EOKA and the ethnarch, Archbishop Makarios, enjoyed overwhelming popular support on the one hand, and the fact that AKEL could not compete with Makarios and the nationalists as far as anti-colonial credentials were concerned, Cypriot communists were forced to accept the dominant role of the Church and of ethnarch Makarios in the politics of Cyprus.<sup>34</sup>

As it transpired, AKEL and Cypriot communists became, throughout Makarios tenure in office (1960-1977) among the most consistent and loyal supporters of his government. This, even though Makarios' government, unlike many Third World countries, rejected the "socialist model" of development. The Soviet Union extended massive economic aid to Third world countries, especially in Africa, that adopted the socialist path to development. In the case of Cyprus, under Makarios' rule, the country adopted a path that allowed the commercial class as well as the propertied classes to thrive. When it came to social policies, AKEL supported a safety net for workers and the weaker classes, promoted cooperatives, and in its capacity as champion of workers' rights, AKEL maintained a solid social base and drew considerable popular support. Still, there was nothing revolutionary in AKEL policies, as they did not call for a radical transformation of the existing socio-economic system. As for Makarios, he had no problem in adopting policies promoting socio-economic justice. He firmly believed in the egalitarian mission the Church, emanating from the teachings of Jesus Christ, and favored a policy of "Christian socialism."<sup>35</sup> In this way, Makarios' "Christian socialism" and AKEL's championing of workers' rights operated in parallel to create a social welfare state within the framework of a mixed economy whereby the free market maintained the upper hand. As a result of this economic model, Cypriot

economy thrived. Even after the devastating effects of the Turkish invasion in 1974 that led to the loss of 70 per cent of its economic resources, as they came under Turkish occupation, Cyprus was able to recover and move on to become a full member of the European Union in 2004.

While AKEL did not project a profile of a revolutionary party domestically, it did align itself with the Soviet Union in world affairs and was a strong champion of the Non-aligned Movement. AKEL participated in the annual Congresses of communist parties that adopted the Soviet line, which, among others, opposed the extension of NATO and American influence, especially via military bases and other facilities, including communication and electronic surveillance, in regions close to the periphery of the Soviet Union. The Eastern Mediterranean was such a region where Cyprus occupied a key geopolitical position. As the Soviet presence and influence in the Middle East grew throughout the 1960s, primarily in Syria and Egypt, and as the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet became an important instrument in projecting Soviet power in the region, Cyprus' strategic value became even more important for Russia. Given all this, when it came to Cyprus, the minimum Soviet objective was to prevent the island republic from becoming a NATO base. NATO, an alliance to which all three guarantor powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey belonged, was seen as anathema to AKEL as well. Consequently, any involvement of NATO in the Cyprus dispute either in the form of a NATO force stationed on the island or placing Cyprus under NATO's umbrella, was strongly opposed by AKEL.

Given all these attributes of Cyprus, it was not surprising, therefore, for Moscow to have good reasons to attempt to lure Makarios towards the Soviet Union. One might have thought that the Cypriot communist party, AKEL, was the ideal vehicle to achieve this goal. In fact, this was the assumption and operative principle of the Kennedy administration

which shaped its Cyprus policy. As it turned out, it was not the communists who "invited" the Soviet Union to enter the Cyprus "chess game," but the collapse of the constitutional order and the ethnic strife that ensued in Christmas 1963.

#### KENNEDY'S OBJECTIVES IN CYPRUS

Cyprus' independence almost coincided with the coming to power of President Kennedy. From the very beginning, the Kennedy administration paid attention to Cyprus given its strategic location. The main objective of the administration was to help the newly independent country stand on its feet and in order to prevent the Soviet Union from getting a foothold on the island. Accordingly, at the time, the United States tended to see AKEL and communism as posing a major threat to Cyprus. What was disturbing for the United States was the prospect of Soviet penetration in Cyprus by using the communist party as proxy to advance Moscow's interests. One source of American concern was the prospect that Makarios, a leader of the Non-aligned Movement, might veer towards the Soviet Union as several other non-aligned countries had done including neighboring Egypt and Syria. In fact, one of the objectives of President Kennedy when it came to the Middle East was to start a dialogue with Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, a leading figure among the Non-aligned, in order to steer him away from the Soviet Union.

The United States did not oppose as such Cyprus' joining the other non-aligned countries. In fact, Washington made it clear to Makarios himself that it did not oppose his non-aligned policies, but viewed them sympathetically provided that Cyprus did not move close to the Soviet Union. The American approval of Makarios' non-alignment was reflected in the warm welcome he received in Washington and by the lavish praise he was bestowed upon by President Kennedy himself and Secretary of State Dean Rusk as well.

Still, uppermost on the American mind at the time, was the "communist threat" in Cyprus in the aftermath of independence. This prospect of communist gains in Cyprus was expressed by President Kennedy himself rather early in his presidency. In a National Security Action Memorandum dated August 22, 1961, and addressed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Kennedy expressed deep concern about communist advances in Cyprus. Notwithstanding his sympathetic view of Makarios as a leader of an anti-colonial movement, a sympathy that was also rooted in his philhellenism, President Kennedy wrote the following in his memorandum: "The inadequacies of the Makarios government, as contrasted with the discipline, energy and able leadership of the local Communist Party, are most worrisome."<sup>36</sup> Then President Kennedy proceeded to express concern that the guarantor powers of Cyprus' independence, Britain, Greece and Turkey, had limited resources to deal with the communist problem in Cyprus and added: "We should carefully review our policy of relying on these guarantor powers to shoulder the principal share of the Western burden."<sup>37</sup>

Within this logic, Kennedy goes on to stress that "Cyprus' real estate and strategic location are of considerable importance to us and our allies."<sup>38</sup> Of primary importance for the United States were the communication facilities they had in Cyprus. These facilities were critical for monitoring communications in the southern periphery of the Soviet Union and throughout the Middle East. Given the cold war and the nuclear arms race, these facilities were vital for American nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. Following the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 that brought the world perilously close to nuclear war, the communication facilities in Cyprus became even more critical for the United States, as electronic spying on the southern Soviet Union could provide the United States an early warning for Soviet nuclear activities.<sup>39</sup> In addition, these facilities allowed the United States

to monitor the Soviet Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as Soviet activities in Syria and Egypt. In all, the American communication facilities in Cyprus were invaluable, and securing their continued presence on the island was uppermost on the mind of president Kennedy and his administration. It was in this framework that the President requested from the State Department to provide him with advice "on what measures would best insure our holding on to it, [Cyprus] including whatever use of US resources may be required."<sup>40</sup>

Considering Kennedy's August 22, 1961, National Security Memorandum, there is little doubt that the American president viewed Cyprus as an important issue that deserved the full attention of his administration. Equally important was the fact, evident in the president's memorandum that the time had come for the United States to become the primary actor in Cyprus when it pertained to security and strategic issues, the communist question and the prospect of Soviet penetration in the island. This meant that there was going to be a change of American policy towards Cyprus that up to that point had ceded to Britain the leadership role to defend western interests. That this was the case was confirmed in the action plan for Cyprus that the State Department prepared at the president's request. This plan recommended the following:

The United States should assume a *more active role in Cyprus than in the past, a role of leadership among the Western nations* in preserving and strengthening Western interests on the island. One of the principal reasons for recommending this policy shift is the need to retain our strategically important communication facilities.... We will continue to consult with the UK, Greece and Turkey, *without, however, forfeiting our freedom of action.*<sup>41</sup> (Emphasis added)

For the United States assuming the leadership role in Cyprus "among the Western nations," it meant that Britain, which was not only a guarantor power but also considered itself to be the hegemonic power in Cyprus, had to accept the new power reality: America's leading role in the Eastern Mediterranean and all the implications emanating from this when it came to Cyprus. Britain was an empire whose moment had passed, and the time had come to accept that the United States could not be a mere follower of England with regard to Cyprus.

In a certain sense, this was somewhat analogous to what happened in Greece toward the end of 1946, when an exhausted Britain, the dominant foreign power and the historic "protector" of Greece, asked the United States to step in and become Greece's "protector" in order to prevent the country from falling under Soviet domination. A few months following the British request, President Truman announced on March 13, 1947, the "Truman Doctrine." Subsequently, massive U.S. military and economic aid, enabled the Greek nationalist forces to defeat the communist guerrillas and place Greece solidly in the western camp and under American hegemony. Fourteen years later, under different circumstances albeit, another American President, John F. Kennedy, embarked on a policy of active involvement in Cyprus which would have signaled an end to the British notion that England was *the* key player in Cyprus on strategic matters especially. Unlike the case of Greece in 1946-1947, however, Britain did not invite the United States to assume a hegemonic role in Cyprus, as it preserved this right exclusively for itself. This divergence of American and British interests in the Middle East should not come as a surprise. As an astute observer of British policy in the Middle put it: "The establishment of paramount American influence in the Middle East is not a British interest *per se*."<sup>42</sup> A propos, on several occasions the United States and Britain adopted

antagonistic positions in this vital geopolitical region.<sup>43</sup> The Suez crisis in October 1956 serves as the best example. What Kennedy was proposing for Cyprus, was to continue the path that his predecessor, President Eisenhower, had charted for the Middle East. Indeed, in the aftermath of the British and French misadventure at Suez in October 1956, the American president sealed Britain's fate in the Middle East. First, Eisenhower made clear his anger at Britain on embarking at the Suez campaign without consulting the United States and at a time when the Hungarian revolution was taking place, a revolution that was crushed by the Soviet Union. Then, the United States positioned its Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and off the shores of Egypt in such a way as to impede the Anglo-French military campaign. And at the United Nations, the Eisenhower administration was instrumental in passing a cease fire resolution that also called for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egypt which included those of Britain, France and Israel. In addition, President Eisenhower, while Britain was faced with economic disaster in the aftermath of the Suez campaign, came to London's assistance and saved, literally, Britain from financial collapse.<sup>44</sup> In fact, British Foreign Secretary Harold MacMillan almost begged the United States to intervene and save the British Pound through American support at the International Monetary Fund. A propos, an authoritative account on how Britain was spared from financial collapse states: "MacMillan still lacked American support and he was forced into supplication to get it."<sup>45</sup> Britain was not only humiliated by its adventurism in Suez but it had to accept that its empire had come to an end and that the United States was in the process of replacing it as the great power in the Middle East.

Cyprus played a pivotal role in the Anglo-French military campaign against Nasser's Egypt as it became the main spring board to launch the airborne assault against Suez.<sup>46</sup> At the time,

fall 1956, the anti-colonial campaign of EOKA was in full gear, and the EOKA guerrillas had been harassing the British forces that have been carrying out the Suez campaign. Not only the British were bitter for this, but following their failure at Suez, they were determined to hold on to Cyprus as their last strategic bastion in the area. In this way, Britain hoped that it could salvage whatever vestiges of British power and prestige had remained in the Middle East, in Iraq and Jordan especially. This hope was also dashed in July 1958, when Iraqi nationalists overthrew the pro-British monarchy in Baghdad and executed England's protégé, King Feisal II. Following the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, the pro-western President of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun saw the Arab nationalist storm approaching Beirut and appealed to the United States and Britain to send military forces to Lebanon. The same fear existed for Jordan, that revolutionary Arab nationalism, with Nasser as its hero, was threatening the other pro-British regime in the area, that of King Hussein. The Eisenhower administration, acting on its own and without consultation with Britain, dispatched 11,000 marines to Lebanon in July 1958 and stabilized the situation in the fragile country. Britain was too weak to take an interventionist decision on its own and "begged" the Eisenhower administration for a similar operation in Jordan to be carried out by British forces.<sup>47</sup> With American approval, two British battalions stationed in Cyprus flew to Jordan to protect major facilities. But, in the final analysis, with the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, Britain's substantial presence in the Middle East came to an end. In all these military operations, Cyprus played an important role, and Britain still thought that somehow, even with an eventual settlement, the island will remain under its dominating influence. This was achieved thanks to the Zurich-London Agreements. In the British mind, the island was to be under England's strategic control long after Cyprus became independent and long after Britain had left the Middle East altogether.<sup>48</sup>

The reality was, however, that after the British debacle at Suez in October 1956 and following the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in July 1958, the United States was the unquestionable power that came to fill the vacuum left by the British retreat from the Middle East. The only former colony where the British were able to keep a strong and permanent military presence that continues until today was Cyprus. President Kennedy's National Security Action Memorandum of August 21, 1961, was indicative that the United States, as in the case of President Eisenhower, was acting as the new dominant power throughout the Middle East where previously Britain was the hegemonic power. In the case of Cyprus, as was the case for the rest of the Middle East, Kennedy recognized that the United Kingdom did not have the resources to play on its own the broader strategic role vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, a role that was required by the island's critical geopolitical location.

That this was the case, the American determination to become actively involved in Cyprus and not leave things up to Britain and the other guarantor powers, was confirmed two weeks later, following the President's August 22 National Security Action Memorandum. Thus, on September 7, 1961, the State Department submitted to the President a memorandum entitled "Proposals for US Action in Cyprus." As a follow up, in a September 25, 1961, National Security Action Memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, informs him that the President approves the State Department's program on Cyprus as presented in the September 7 memorandum. Bundy informs Dean Rusk that President Kennedy desires that US action in Cyprus, in accordance with the State Department's program should be "pushed vigorously" and in order "to contain and reduce communist strength."<sup>49</sup> In addition, Bundy informs the Secretary of State that the President "requests that we impress upon, Greece, Turkey and the UK

of the importance we attach to helping Cyprus and urge them to step up their efforts as well."<sup>50</sup> This represented a diplomatic way of informing Britain above all, that from now on the United States was going to have its own special relationship with Cyprus and that Britain had no monopoly of strategic control of the island anymore. Certainly, the Kennedy administration did not want to act unilaterally by ignoring Britain when it came to Cyprus. This was not Kennedy's intention. In fact, in all subsequent American plans regarding Cyprus, Britain was fully informed. But this was done by an assertive Kennedy administration that was confident of its strategic supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East on the one hand and cognizant of the limitations of British power on the other. British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, who succeeded Eden, was conscious of Britain's limited capabilities in world affairs. After all, it was MacMillan who presided over the removing of Anthony Eden as prime minister following the Suez fiasco and in recognition that Britain could neither act unilaterally in the Middle East nor pretend that it was the dominant regional power.<sup>51</sup> This did not mean that British influence had been eliminated altogether from the Middle East. Britain maintained close relations with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia while its relations with Israel were friendly. An important element in maintaining some British influence in the Middle East was British arms sales to several Arab regimes. It should also be noted that President Kennedy's relations with Prime Minister Harold MacMillan were cordial. Indeed, the American President sought MacMillan's advice during the Berlin crisis in the fall of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, and cooperated closely with Britain in the negotiations with the Soviet Union over the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the three powers signed in August 1963.

In the end, Kennedy's policy, which was seeking a key role for the United States in Cyprus, was not aimed at an-

tagonizing Britain. Rather, it was the result of the inherent limitations of Britain which could not presume to be a global power any more. Still, when it came to Cyprus, the United Kingdom reserved for itself a special role emanating from its sovereign military bases and the other extraordinary privileges that England secured through the Zurich-London Agreements.

### JUNE 1962: MAKARIOS MEETS PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Eight months following the State Department's September 1961 action plan for Cyprus, which had the full backing of President Kennedy, President Makarios, the architect of Cypriot independence as well as an important leader of the Non-aligned Movement, was visiting Washington as a very special guest of the president. Fourteen months earlier, in April 1961, another Greek leader visited Washington, the Prime Minister of Greece Constantine Karamanlis. The purpose of his visit was to reaffirm the traditional friendship, close ties and the alliance between the United States and Greece, as well discuss NATO issues and the situation in southeastern Europe. During an official White Luncheon in honor of the Greek prime minister, President Kennedy made known, once more, his deep philhellenism by stating:

It is great pleasure for me to welcome you to the shores of the United States once again. Someone once said that everyone is either an Athenian or a Spartan—in any case, we are all Greeks in the great sense of recognizing the wellspring from which all of our efforts began. I am sure that sometimes the Greeks get tired of hearing about ancient history, because they are concerned with making history today. But we look to ancient Greece for inspiration, and we look to modern Greece for comradeship.<sup>52</sup>

These words of welcome to the Greek prime minister did not reflect diplomatic platitudes, but the deeper appreciation President Kennedy had for classical Greece and its impact on western civilization. He was quite familiar with classical Greek philosophy and civilization in general, because, among others, he had studied the classics at Harvard. Moreover, Kennedy resorted to the Greek classics at times of crisis, this, as a source of valuable lessons regarding the nature of power, the art of governing and the dilemmas leaders face.<sup>53</sup> At the exact time of Karamanlis' visit, however, April 17-20, 1961, the political and diplomatic climate in Washington was dominated by Cuba and the Bay of Pigs. The CIA sponsored invasion of the Bay of Pigs took place on April 17, 1961, and ended up in the disastrous defeat of the American trained and equipped forces that invaded Cuba. It was the greatest failure of President Kennedy and he took full blame for it. Thus, when Kennedy met Karamanlis and held a face to face discussion at the White House on April 19, 1961, this meeting took place under the dark cloud of the Bay of Pigs failure. The meeting lasted between 10:30-11:44 am. On two occasions during the meeting, President Kennedy had to leave the room in order to deal with the Bay of Pigs fiasco.<sup>54</sup>

It took a little time, however, for Kennedy to recover from the disastrous American defeat at the Bay of Pigs as he came under a storm of domestic and international criticism. By the time Makarios arrived in Washington in early June 1962, the Bay of Pigs fiasco had faded. President Kennedy's image both domestically and internationally was growing. The successes in space exploration in 1961 and 1962 demonstrated the technological superiority of America over the Soviet Union. On May 5, 1961, NASA put a man in space when Commander Alan Shepard made a suborbital flight. Later in May, speaking to Congress, President Kennedy committed the United States to land a man on the moon before the end of the decade, something that was accomplished in July 1969. And on February

20, 1962, John Glen became the first American astronaut who circled the earth, to be followed on May 24 by Scott Carpenter. In fact, the same day, June 5, when President Kennedy welcomed Makarios at the White House, he also received and honored astronaut Carpenter. These American successes in space and the pursuing of an active international agenda by President Kennedy were combined with his charisma to give him unprecedented international prestige and popularity.

Seen in the context of the cold war and the Soviet-American rivalry in strategic regions and in places like the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, President Kennedy needed to demonstrate that he was the leader of the Free World who could stand up to the Soviet Union while remaining true in promoting his ideals of freedom, democracy, social justice and economic progress around the globe. The Third World was the testing ground, and Cyprus was par excellence a strategically located country where an American success would have a demonstration effect, especially in the broader Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions. But American policy in Cyprus could succeed only if it had the full backing of its popular president, Archbishop Makarios.

In an unusual gesture, since it involved a leader of a very small country, John Kennedy went to the National Airport on the morning of June 5, 1962, and welcomed personally the Cypriot president who was received with full military honors. As if to emphasize the importance of Makarios' visit to Washington, present at the welcoming ceremony at the airport were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Naval chief George Anderson, the Ambassadors of the Commonwealth as well as the Ambassadors of Britain, Greece and Turkey. In his welcoming remarks, President Kennedy expressed his personal admiration for Makarios, whose struggles for freedom were well known worldwide. We recognize you and admire you as a "courageous fighter for freedom," President Kennedy declared.<sup>55</sup> Similar warmth prevailed during the of-

ficial Luncheon at the White House later in the day. During his speech, President Kennedy expressed again his personal admiration for Makarios stating among others "I do not believe that there is another founder of a contemporary state who has been able to chart such a course (towards freedom) in the midst of so many difficulties."<sup>56</sup>

On his part, Makarios, who was a great admirer of President Kennedy, saw in his face not only a philhellene but also the great champion of freedom for all the peoples who had been fighting against oppression and colonialism. In his response to President Kennedy's flattering speeches, Makarios expressed his deepest admiration for the American leader. He stated how deep was his desire to meet President Kennedy, he reminiscent of their first meeting in Boston a few years earlier, and he expressed his profound gratitude to John Kennedy for his support over the years for Cyprus' struggle for freedom.<sup>57</sup>

During the meeting between the American and Cypriot delegations at the White House, President Kennedy opened the discussion with a request that Cyprus allows the establishment of a Voice of America transmitter on the island. Kennedy also expressed his appreciation that Cyprus allowed the American communication facilities to operate and emphasized their importance for the United States.<sup>58</sup> Regarding Kennedy's request for a VOA transmitter, Makarios initially said that if he accepted, some other countries might see it as abandonment of his non-aligned policies. But he proceeded to add with a twinkle that he would like to see a VOA transmitter in Cyprus, especially if it was going to be installed "in my own region," meaning by that the mountains of Paphos where he came from.<sup>59</sup> Then President Kennedy raised the question of communist influence in Cyprus by pointing out the superior organization of the communist party AKEL and pointed out how Mao utilized such superior organization to establish political control in China. In

essence, President Kennedy was expressing to Makarios the same concerns had had about the "communist threat" in Cyprus as they were stated in his August 21, 1961, National Security Memorandum. Subsequently, the two leaders discussed the problems Cyprus was facing in developing its economy and resources. A major objective of the Kennedy administration was to provide Cyprus development aid, and President Kennedy and Makarios engaged in a discussion over which were the most appropriate areas where American assistance was needed. It was agreed that the focus should be on the following areas: Development of water resources; establishment of a social insurance program; assistance in organizing a labor movement; a police training program; establishment of an American University. Before the meeting ended, President Kennedy gave instructions to Philips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of NEA, and William Gaud, Assistant Administrator of AID, to see that the social insurance project and the American University scheme receive priority so that an early decision can be given to the Cyprus government.<sup>60</sup> At the conclusion of the meeting Makarios and the President "exchanged expressions of warm satisfaction that the Archbishop had come to this country and that they had the opportunity for friendly and useful talks."<sup>61</sup>

Archbishop Makarios was very pleased with the talks he had with the President. This was reflected in the speech he gave during a luncheon he offered at the Blair House on June 6, in honor of President Kennedy and the First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy:

I remember fondly the meeting we had in Boston a few years ago when you received me as Senator from Massachusetts and during which we discussed the Cyprus issue. Since then, you have expressed your interest and support for Cypriot freedom in many ways in the Congress and elsewhere...I have some of the letters you wrote expressing your solidarity with our

struggle and these letters are among my most beloved memorabilia....The people of Cyprus and myself, deeply appreciated the genuine interest you are showing to our young republic...In your face, we salute not only the great leader of the American people but also a great friend of Cyprus...Under your inspired leadership, the United States are performing their role in world affairs with greater confidence than ever before. This conviction is not only the result of the scientific and technical progress and the overall material power of America. But all these are also a result of the moral power, that you personally, Mr. President, have inspired (around the world).<sup>62</sup>

On several other occasions during his visit, Makarios expressed his deepest feelings of friendship and admiration for the American people.

Later on the day, on June 6, President Makarios addressed a joint session of Congress, a rare honor for a leader of a small country such as Cyprus. He thanked the people of the United States and the Congress because "since the dawn of its history and through great sacrifice they opened the avenues of freedom not only for themselves but for other peoples as well. We all know that this country has made courageous efforts to assist morally and materially the enslaved and oppressed peoples fighting for their freedom."<sup>63</sup> And then, Makarios re-affirmed his friendship and solidarity with the United States by declaring: "In the midst of the political antagonisms and ongoing ideological conflicts, the freedom loving peoples of the world look upon the United States of America with confidence as they represent the defender of freedom, justice and peace."<sup>64</sup>

Following his address before Congress, Makarios offered an official banquet at Mayflower Hotel in honor of Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In his speech, the Cypriot leader stated

that following his meetings with President Kennedy, "my fears about the present diminished and my hopes for the future became greater."<sup>65</sup> Then, he proceeded to describe the cold war environment and tensions around the globe and explained what Cyprus' policy of nonalignment meant. This policy was based on a commitment to the principles of freedom, justice and peace and willingness to cooperate with the United States to advance these goals. On his part, Secretary Rusk expressed great admiration for Makarios as a leader who, like America's founding fathers, is also the father of a country, Cyprus.<sup>66</sup> It was a great flattery to Makarios to be compared by the American Secretary of State to the Founding Fathers. In addition, and very importantly, Dean Rusk confirmed that the United States was not concerned by Makarios' non-aligned policy, "these ideas don't bother us," Rusk declared, as long as they are based on ethical and constitutional values aimed at promoting the right of peoples for freedom.<sup>67</sup> The Secretary of State made sure, however, that Makarios understood that the United States was against "neutrality" if this meant avoiding taking a stand for freedom and democracy so as not to offend the Soviet Union.<sup>68</sup>

Makarios left Washington quite pleased not only because his visit was very successful but also because he fulfilled a dream of his, to meet President Kennedy. "This was the greatest event in my life," Makarios told Vice President Lyndon Johnson who paid a visit to Cyprus on August 30-31, 1962. During the meeting, the American vice president stressed American concern about the "growing communist threat" in Cyprus, especially in view of the 1965 elections. Makarios assured Johnson, that there was no such danger for Cyprus and explained to him the limits of AKEL's influence.<sup>69</sup>

#### KENNEDY ASSASSINATED

Makarios' visit to Washington and his meetings with President Kennedy in June 1962 acquire special signifi-

cance considering what transpired in Cyprus less than one and a half years later. The assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas on November 22, 1963, was not only an American tragedy but was a wound for the whole world as well. Relations between the Greek Turkish communities in Cyprus were already tense when Kennedy was assassinated. For a very brief period of time, the worldwide impact of Kennedy's assassination reverberated in Cyprus as well and overshadowed the local ethnic tensions. It was already Saturday morning of November 23 in Cyprus when the newspapers came out with huge banners announcing Kennedy's assassination. That same day, a deeply saddened President Makarios appeared on television and addressed the people of Cyprus. He expressed the pain felt throughout the island for the loss of the "champion of freedom, democracy, equality and justice. President Kennedy fought for these principles and died for them."<sup>70</sup> Thereafter, and on President Makarios' orders, Cyprus declared three days of mourning as flags on public buildings and schools flew half mast. On the same morning of November 23, schoolchildren were dismissed from school. Before they went home, however, they gathered heard speeches by their teachers in praise of the dead president. As a prayer was recited for the slain American president, teachers and students could not hold back their tears. Their sorrow was deep as they felt that the shining light for humanity but also the beacon of hope for tormented Cyprus was extinguished so prematurely. On the third day of the official mourning, and on President Makarios' order, all government offices and public services and agencies closed. On the morning of Monday, November 25, the day of Kennedy's funeral in Washington, a memorial service for John F. Kennedy was held at the Catholic Church of Holy Cross in Nicosia, with the primate of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, attending. The whole cabinet also attended, including Turkish Cypriot Vice

President, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk. Towards the end of the service, a solemn Archbishop Makarios delivered the Greek Orthodox memorial eulogy: "May your memory be eternal, our blessed and unforgettable brother John."

### MAKARIOS' PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION

On November 30, 1963, five days after President Kennedy's funeral in Washington, Makarios officially submitted his proposals, consisting of 13 points, to amend the Constitution. He had legitimate reasons in doing so because he was proposing reasonable amendments to revise a constitution that proved utterly dysfunctional.<sup>71</sup> The question was whether it was politically expedient to do so at the time. In taking such a drastic step, however, President Makarios had the encouragement of Britain and its High Commissioner in Cyprus Sir Arthur Clark.<sup>72</sup> In fact, when Makarios announced his proposals to amend the Constitution, known as the "13 points," Sir Arthur exclaimed: "Your Beatitude, what you are doing today is an act of great statesmanship."<sup>73</sup>

There is little doubt that relations between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority had deteriorated to such an extent by the fall of 1963 that very delicate diplomacy was required in order to avoid a violent confrontation between the two ethnic communities. In the background of the British encouragement to Makarios to propose the amendment of the Constitution was the opposition by Turkey that was well known to Britain. Moreover, in the spring of 1963, the Greek government, through its Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff, addressed a lengthy letter to Makarios explaining why it did not favor amending the constitution at the time.<sup>74</sup> Averoff personally informed the American Ambassador to Athens Henry Labouisse about the letter he had sent to Makarios. In a telegram to the State Department following the meeting, Labouisse described as follows Averoff's attitude towards

Makarios' plans to amend the constitution:

The Government of Greece is prepared to help Cyprus reach a reasonable solution as in the past, but if Makarios should seek to force revision of the Constitution, Greece and Cyprus must then go separate ways.<sup>75</sup>

In addition, there was deep American concern that matters were getting out of hand in Cyprus. On June 6, 1963, Frazer Wilkins, the American ambassador in Cyprus, met President Makarios and discussed several economic matters. During the meeting, Makarios informed the ambassador that "in his own mind, he reached the conclusion that it would be necessary to revise the Cypriot Constitution," but had not as yet decided on the timing and the procedure, considering that the basic articles of the Constitution were unamendable. This required careful consideration, Makarios told Wilkins. Then Makarios turned to the Treaty of Guarantee and told the American ambassador that there were varied interpretations as to whether the guarantor powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey) had the right to intervene militarily in Cyprus and added:

Cyprus could not be described as an independent country if other countries had the right of intervention and had their troops stationed in Cyprus as Greece and Turkey did....[I] prefer that [Cyprus] become a member of NATO than be guaranteed by Greece and Turkey.<sup>76</sup> (Emphasis added)

The last part of Makarios' statement regarding NATO was extraordinary, as it conveyed his willingness to seek a settlement that fully protected western interests in the Eastern Mediterranean with Cyprus becoming a member of NATO. This was quite a logical proposition by Makarios, considering that the three guarantor powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey, were members of NATO themselves. It also demonstrated

that Makarios was not beholden to the communist AKEL which saw NATO as anathema. On his part, the American ambassador urged Makarios to seek a solution to the constitutional problems by direct talks with the Turkish Cypriot leadership and discouraged him from adopting "some more radical approach, such as reference to the UN."<sup>77</sup>

On June 21, 1963, President Makarios handed Fraser Wilkins, the U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus who was about to depart for Washington, a confidential memorandum. In it, Makarios explained the reasons why the amendment of the constitution was necessary, noting that during the February 1959 London negotiations that led to the Zurich-London Agreements, he had expressed serious reservations to several provision and made an effort to amend them, an effort that was not accepted. Then Makarios' memorandum proceeds as follows:

Since independence, it has become abundantly clear that certain constitutional provisions are unworkable in actual practice, as for example the provision with regard to separate municipalities in the five main towns of the island. Other provisions requiring separate majorities for enactment of taxation legislation, create many obstacles in the smooth running of the state and seriously hinder the government's efforts to apply a sound policy of economic development...This anomalous state of affairs...is made even worse by the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance...Any attempt by one or the other three countries to intervene would unavoidably lead to a very serious situation in Cyprus, with great possibility of wider conflict between Greece and Turkey... There is no doubt that certain provisions of the Constitution should be revised. The question which arises is what procedures should be followed in order to meet the situation...It would have been a very good thing if all interested parties would acquiesce to

such revision. But if this were to be impossible, then the Greek Cypriot leadership will proceed with the revision of the Constitution, *employing internationally accepted democratic methods and procedures...* A constitutional Assembly would be entrusted with the task of effecting the necessary amendments to the Constitution.<sup>78</sup> (Emphasis added)

In the discourse of western liberal democracy on the one hand and of de-colonization on the other, Makarios' reasoning for the need to amend the constitution was quite convincing. This should have been especially the case for the United States when it came to amending the constitution. In a democracy, amending the constitution, through a certain procedure, is logical as it is necessary. Any introductory textbook on the American government points this out with words such as, "Like all constitutions, the American document also describes the way it can be changed."<sup>79</sup>

Certainly, amending the U.S. Constitution requires a special procedure. But in the final analysis, the amendments effected to the American constitution since 1776 had a most profound impact on American society. The first ten amendments especially, known as the Bill of Rights, are those that guarantee the quintessential rights and freedoms of the American people. America is unimaginable without the Bill of Rights. Indeed, it is doubtful if American democracy would have been consolidated and strengthened without the amendments to the Constitution. Consequently, a constitution that prohibits its amendment, such as the Cypriot one, is not just an anomaly but a negation of democracy itself.

In this framework that takes into account the philosophy of the Founding Fathers and America's constitutional history, especially the Amendments to the Constitution, Makarios' June 21, 1963; memorandum addressed to the United States, made good sense. He had hoped that more than anyone else,

Americans would understand and be sympathetic to his plans to amend the Cypriot Constitution.

Cyprus, however, was not a normal case of a society that could decide its own fate and through a natural constitutional process that would involve, for instance, a constitutional assembly that could amend the constitution. This was so because, in the final analysis, Cyprus was a victim of neo-colonialism as its fate remained in the hands of external powers even after independence. As a consequence, the Kennedy administration was faced with this neo-colonial predicament when it came to charting a policy to deal with the deepening constitutional crisis in 1963, which threatened to lead to open ethnic conflict on the island that could draw in Greece and Turkey.

This deep concern about developments in Cyprus was expressed by President Kennedy himself in October 1963 and while the air of ethnic tension was felt throughout the island. Evidently, President Kennedy considered the political and constitutional impasse in Cyprus an alarming development that could lead to Greek-Turkish bloodshed. Such a development not only was undesirable in any case, but would signal an end to President's Kennedy's effort to make Cyprus a showcase of freedom, democracy and socio-economic progress among the non-aligned countries. Such success would also guarantee that the strategically located island would stay close to the West and deprive the Soviet Union of any opportunity to expand its influence there. Thus, in the third week of October 1963, only 35 days before he was assassinated, President Kennedy expressed his anxiety about developments in Cyprus. In an October 17, 1963, National Security Action Memorandum, the National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, informed the Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the President was concerned about the deteriorating situation in Cyprus and that he asked that the United States do all it could to "prevent a showdown

between the Greek and Turkish communities," in cooperation with the guarantor powers.<sup>80</sup> Accordingly, the President requested that the State Department provide him by October 28 with "its recommendations on what measures to be taken in this end."<sup>81</sup>

Indeed, on October 28, 1963, the State Department reported back to the president with its recommendations regarding the deteriorating situation in Cyprus. In a memorandum to the White House from Benjamin Read, the Executive Secretary of the Department of State, a new action plan for Cyprus was proposed by the Department. The memorandum makes brief mention of the successful economic steps taken in Cyprus and continues:

However, the relations between the Greek and Turkish communities have deteriorated in the process of putting into practice the provisions of the Cyprus Constitution and some of *the unusual guarantees given to the Turkish minority* at the time of the Cyprus settlement in 1959...the recent deterioration of the Cyprus situation points to the *strong possibility of communal violence in 1964*.<sup>82</sup> (Emphasis added)

Then, the memorandum proceeds to present the British approach vis á vis the deepening constitutional crisis as follows:

On October 21, the British gave us the details of a new approach they will carry out in the near future. Their plan restricts itself to efforts to promote new negotiations between the Cypriot communities based on "fair and reasonable" Greek Cypriot proposals, *to persuade Turkey to consider reasonable suggestions for constitutional change* and to arrange a subsequent informal meeting of representatives of the Guarantor Powers and the Government of Cyprus to approve the changes negotiated by the

Cypriots. Our approach serves as a fallback position to the British plan.<sup>83</sup> (Emphasis added)

Subsequently, the memorandum presents the new American action plan for Cyprus as follows:

In specific terms, the United States approach proposes:

1. The Department will urge the United Kingdom to call on Greece and Turkey to agree to a three-power approach to Cyprus President Makarios and Vice President Kuchuk, with assurances of United States support.

2. The three-power approach will require the Cypriot leaders to reaffirm support of the London-Zurich Agreements and the Cyprus Constitution.

3. The approach will require that the municipality dispute be settled by the establishment of separate town councils as specified by the Constitution but with the understanding that the separate councils will be superseded by joint municipalities after a test period.

4. The three-power approach will also *in effect revise the London-Zurich agreement* to allow the two communities *to use normal amendment procedures* in the case of two presently unamendable but highly contentious article of the Constitution.<sup>84</sup> (Emphasis added)

Then, the memorandum describes the principal constitutional changes desired by Makarios adding that the Cypriot President "is realistic" and knows that formal changes in the Constitution and treaties to this broad extent will be unacceptable to Turkey. The memorandum goes on to express the opinion that the Cypriot leader will "pick up" the suggestion by the British High Commissioner of proposing "interpretation of the Constitution" instead of its outward amendment.

The October 28, 1963, State Department Memorandum

for the President is, in retrospect, quite revealing and to a degree can explain the British encouragement of Makarios to propose the amendment of the Constitution. While on the diplomatic level it is very cautious and warns that the amending of the Cyprus Constitution can come about only through mutual agreement of the parties, it does accept, that in the final analysis, constitutions, including the Cypriot one, are subject to amendment. As it transpired, a few days earlier, on October 20, 1963, Philips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, and Raymond Hare, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, held separate meetings in Ankara with Ismet Inonu, the Turkish Prime Minister and with Acting Foreign Minister Feyzioglu. Both Turkish officials expressed strong opposition to any amendment of the Cypriot Constitution. To this Talbot suggested that:

Turkey should not oppose all changes in the Cypriot Constitution and pointed out to the *demonstrated advantages of the flexibility of the U.S. Constitution*.<sup>85</sup> (Emphasis added)

The Turkish Acting Foreign Minister immediately rejected the argument. This American position that the Cypriot Constitution could be amended, even though this would require Turkey's consent, was consistent with America's own constitutional history and experience, as well as a fundamental rule of democratic theory and practice. Furthermore, in the October 28, 1963, Memorandum, the State Department accepted from the outset that the Cypriot Constitution was dysfunctional in practice considering the "unusual guarantees given to the Turkish minority." This is also consistent with an earlier assessment of the State Department that from the very beginning, when the Zurich-London Agreements were signed in 1959, the Cypriot Constitution was considered unworkable.<sup>86</sup>

This memorandum also seems to share a certain British

optimism that if Makarios' proposals were "fair and reasonable," the United Kingdom might be able to persuade Turkey not to reject them and accept a diplomatic process involving the government of Cyprus and the Guarantor Powers to reach an agreement to that effect. Moreover, Britain was well aware that, notwithstanding Washington's opposition to any unilateral step towards amending the Cypriot Constitution by Makarios, the American political philosophy as well as constitutional practice accepted that constitutions should be subject to amendment and that this was a *sine qua non* for a democratic society. In fact, Sir Arthur Clark, the British High Commissioner, informed Glafkos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives, that "that the Ambassador of the USA found the [Makarios] proposals reasonable and advised the Turkish side not to be negative, but to make counter proposals on the points which they disagree."<sup>87</sup> All this might explain, to a certain degree, the reasons behind British encouragement of Makarios to submit his 13 proposals for amending the Constitution. The Cypriot President did so on November 30, 1963. By December 7, 1963, however, any British or American optimism for that matter, evaporated when Turkey officially rejected altogether Makarios' constitutional proposals. When the American Ambassador to Turkey, Raymond Hare was informed of this decision by Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin, he considered this development a "reversal" and told the Turkish official that:

...this news was very disappointing, because, irrespective of the nature of the proposals, the Foreign Minister's previous decision to study carefully and reply specifically seemed the wisest course.<sup>88</sup>

Following Turkey's rejection, the air of ethnic tension was pervasive throughout Cyprus. Both sides, Greeks and Turks, had been preparing by arming themselves for the al-

most inevitable collapse of the constitutional order.<sup>89</sup> When violent conflict erupted the third week of December, it came as no surprise.

In this way, and in a few weeks following Kennedy's assassination, his dreams about Cyprus unraveled. By Christmas 1963, bloody clashes between Greeks and Turks were taking place throughout Cyprus, while on several occasions over the next eight months Greece and Turkey came close to war. Britain appeared as the peacemaker on the island by providing the military forces required separating the Greek and Turkish fighting forces and securing the cease fire. On December 30, 1963, a green pencil was used to draw on a map the cease fire line in Nicosia, and since then, the term "Green Line" has become synonymous with lines separating combatants around the world.<sup>90</sup> In March 1964, the UN Security Council approved the dispatching of a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus known as UNFICYP. It arrived shortly thereafter, and forty-four years later it is still there.

As it transpired, the great beneficiary of the Cyprus debacle was the Soviet Union. In February 1964, the Johnson administration took the initiative to bring about a Cyprus settlement. The American diplomatic effort was led by US Assistant Secretary of State George Ball. In successive meetings with Makarios in Nicosia (February 13-14, 1964), Ball proposed the introduction into Cyprus of a NATO peacekeeping force. This was rejected by President Makarios, who insisted that any peacekeeping force should be under UN mandate and that the Cyprus dispute should be a matter for the United Nations to handle. Ball's pressure on Makarios was unbearable. Indeed, the American diplomat used bland language during his meetings with Makarios, and in his memoirs, Ball does not hide his intense animosity, bordering personal hatred, towards the Archbishop.<sup>91</sup> As Turkey escalated its threats to invade Cyprus, Turkish fighter jets overflew the

capital Nicosia while Turkish warships sailed off the shores of Kyrenia, Makarios turned to the United Nations and also to the Soviet Union for diplomatic support. Moscow was looking for the opportunity, and came to Makarios' assistance, especially at the United Nations. The Soviets also warned Turkey against any military move in Cyprus. The Soviet diplomatic support to Cyprus, however, did not mark a clear victory for Makarios. In the process of its active diplomatic involvement in the Cyprus dispute, Moscow found the opportunity to begin a rapprochement with Turkey. By the summer of 1964, Turkey also grew disillusioned with the United States. On June 5, 1964, President Johnson send a bland letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu warning him against invading Cyprus. As a result, Ankara shelved its plans to invade the island. Turkish bitterness was such, however, that Ankara turned to the Soviet Union. In November 1964, Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin was visiting Moscow. In January 1965, the Soviet President Nikolay Podgorny paid a highly publicized visit to Turkey. Turkish-Soviet rapprochement had begun with the Cyprus dispute becoming the catalyst for it. Regarding the Cyprus issue as such, the Soviet Union moved closer to the Turkish position supporting a "federal solution," an anathema to the Greek side. From the American perspective, however, the Cyprus imbroglio led to the worst possible consequences. It moved Makarios closer to the Soviet Union; it became a catalyst for a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, while it contributed to the further destabilization of the Greek political system, ending with the military dictatorship of April 1967. The Cyprus disaster was completed in 1974. The Greek junta in Athens, which enjoyed the implicit and, on several occasions, the explicit support of the Nixon administration, engineered a coup and overthrew President Makarios on July 15, 1974.<sup>92</sup> Washington implicitly accepted the coup, and in fact it was not unhappy to see Makarios go.<sup>93</sup> In contrast to Washington,

the British government firmly condemned the Athens coup in Cyprus and came to the rescue of Makarios.<sup>94</sup> At the time, Washington and London did not see eye to eye on several strategic issues, and some policy makers in the Nixon administration looked at the British Premier Harold Wilson with suspicion for being too open-minded to Soviet ideas on disarmament.<sup>95</sup> How to deal with the Athens coup against Makarios was one area of contention between London and Washington.

At the time, mid-July 1974, President Nixon, facing imminent impeachment due to the Watergate scandal, was hardly preoccupied with foreign policy as the White House was paralyzed.<sup>96</sup> Consequently, the Cyprus crisis was handled exclusively by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.<sup>97</sup> Five days following the coup against Makarios, Turkey invaded and occupied 38 percent of Cyprus, an occupation that still continues.

The watershed development that ushered these series of tumultuous events in Cyprus, was the collapse of the constitutional order in Cyprus in December 1963 and the bloodshed that ensued, this, a month following Kennedy's assassination. One of the major consequences of this collapse, was precisely what President Kennedy wanted to avoid, a Soviet penetration in the Eastern Mediterranean. His administration feared that the Cypriot communist movement was a great threat, since it might become the catalyst for extending Soviet influence over the strategically located island. Ironically, the Soviet Union was able to become an active player in Cyprus, not because the Cypriot communists "invited" Moscow, but because of ethnic conflict and external intervention in the island's affairs. It was an ethnic conflict that, to a substantial degree, was the legacy of colonialism, the colonialism that had been denounced with conviction by John F. Kennedy. It was, to a considerable degree, the legacy of British colonialism that defeated the lofty ambitions of President Kennedy

when he became involved with Cyprus. His interest about Cyprus, however, was hardly accidental. The surviving Kennedy brother, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, kept the Cyprus issue high on the Congressional agenda, especially in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion in 1974, continuing the legacy of his slain brother, John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, John F. Kennedy, "Imperialism, the Enemy of Freedom," Congressional Record CIII, Part 8, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1957, p. 10783

<sup>2</sup> The Zurich London Agreements are found in *Great Britain, Colonial Office, Conference on Cyprus*. Documents Signed and Initialed at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959. Cmnd. 679, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959.

<sup>3</sup> For the constitutional provisions defining the power of each branch, see Stanley Kyriakides, *Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp. 55-71.

<sup>4</sup> On the EOKA campaign see the memoirs of its leader George Grivas-Digenis, *Apomnemonemata Agonos EOKA, 1955-1959* (Memoirs of the EOKA Struggle, 1955-1959, Athens: 1961). Several British authors have written extensively on the EOKA campaign. Among others, see Charles Foley, *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus, from Rebellion to Civil War* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964); Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account on the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen, 1978); Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

<sup>5</sup> For the Treaty of Guarantee see *Great Britain, Colonial Office, Cyprus*, Cmnd. 1093, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960, pp. 86-87.

<sup>6</sup> Frederica Bunge, editor, *Cyprus: A Country Study*. (Foreign Area Studies, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1980), p. xxvii.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> On consociational politics and Cyprus, see Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 140-148. On the theory of consociational democracy, see also Brian Barry, "Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October, 1975): pp. 477-505.

<sup>9</sup> The British policy of drawing the "Turkish factor" into the Cyprus dispute and its divisive impact is examined by several British authors includ-

ing: Robert Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp. 137-156; Holland, op.cit. pp. 100, 163-167, 202-203, 255-257, 263-265, 285; Barnaby Rogerson, *Cyprus* (London: Cadogan Island Guides, 1994), pp. 50-51; Foley, op.cit. 30, 89, 119-129; see also Christos P. Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province* (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide Caratzas Publisher, 1991), pp. 56-59; Van Coufoudakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multi-religious Societies—The Cyprus Case," in *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, ed. Van Coufoudakis (New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 32-39.

<sup>10</sup> Cranshaw, op.cit. 277.

<sup>11</sup> For EOKA documents related to the planning stage of its campaign and the attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots, see Speros Papageorgiou, ed., *Archeion Paranomon Egrafon tou Kypriakou Agonos, 1955-1959* (Archive of Illegal Documents of the Cypriot Struggle, 1955-1959), Second Edition (Nicosia: Epiphaniou Publishers, 1984), pp. 152-153; On the same subject, see Grivas-Digenis, op.cit., pp. 51-52, 256-262.

<sup>12</sup> See Costas Kyrris, *History of Cyprus* (Nicosia: Nicocles Publishing Co., 1985), pp. 369-371.

<sup>13</sup> For a thorough analysis of the unique Cypriot constitution and the dynamics that contributed to the 1963 crisis, see Kyriakides, op.cit. 51-146.

<sup>14</sup> See Elias Vlantou and Diana Alicia, "The 1959 Cyprus Agreement: Oracle of Disaster," *The Journal of Hellenic Diaspora*, vol. Xi, no. 4 (Winter 1984): pp. 5-31. The authors analyze a 1959 declassified State Department report on the Cypriot constitution.

<sup>15</sup> Holland, op.cit., p. 331.

<sup>16</sup> For an analysis of the constitutional impasse over income tax legislation see Kyriakides, op.cit., pp. 83-92.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 96

<sup>18</sup> See Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, January 5, 1962, 6 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1-562. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia);

Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, Nicosia, January 12, 1962. 8 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1-1262. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara and London).

<sup>19</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, Nicosia, January 16, 1963, 4 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 780A. 00/1-1663. Confidential); Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State. Nicosia, February 7, 1963, 11 a.m. (Department of State Central Files, POL 18, Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to London, Athens and Ankara); Telegram from the Embassy in the United

Kingdom to the Department of State, London, February 23, 1963, 2 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL. 18, Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia); Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, April 27, 1963, noon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL. 18 Cyp. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara and London). Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, Nicosia, June 6, 1963, noon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens and London).

<sup>20</sup> On Kennedy's support of the Cypriot struggle for *enosis*, see *Apanta Archiepiskopou Makariou III*, Vol. III, January 1963-March 1964 (Nicosia: The Makarios III Foundation, January 1966), p. 283.

<sup>21</sup> John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Archives, Speeches: Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at the Fourth Annual Rockhurst College in Kansas City, Missouri, Saturday, June 2, 1956.

<sup>22</sup> See John F. Kennedy, "Imperialism, the Enemy of Freedom," pp. 10783-10784.

<sup>23</sup> For Latin America, President Kennedy established, in March 1961, the Alliance for Progress.

<sup>24</sup> Makarios' non-aligned policies are examined by Joseph Joseph, "The International Power Broker: A Critical View of the Foreign Policy of Archbishop Makarios," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 3 (2), 1992, pp. 7-33.

<sup>25</sup> On Makarios' charismatic authority, see Markides, *op.cit.*, pp. 42-47.

<sup>26</sup> AKEL in Greek stands for *Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou* or Restorative Party of the Working People. It was established in 1941. It succeeded the Communist Party of Cyprus (*Kypriako Kommunistiko Komma*) that was formally established in 1926 and was banned in 1933. See Yiorgos Leventis, *Cyprus: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the 1940s, Prelude to Deeper Crisis* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002), pp. 51-67.

<sup>27</sup> Markides, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>28</sup> See Michael Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979), pp. 109-110.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>30</sup> This decision was taken by the AKEL Central Committee in May 1957 and came to reaffirm earlier AKEL decisions vis a vis the EOKA campaign. Quoted in the newspaper *Politis*, Nicosia, March 5, 2008. On AKEL's opposition to the EOKA campaign see also, Attalides, pp. 110-112; Kyriakides, *op.cit.*, pp. 73-74. Markides, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>31</sup> See for instance the treatise by George Kakoyiannis, *He Akelike Egesia kai o Enoplos Agonas* (AKEL's Leadership and the Armed Struggle) (Limassol: 1959).

<sup>32</sup> On the Iranian Tudeh party, see Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement*

in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); On the Mujahedin see the major study by Ervand Abrahamian, *The Iranian Mojahedin* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1992); On the subject of relations among different leftist groups in Iran and their anti-Shah activities, see Sharam Chubin, "Leftist Forces in Iran," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1980, pp. 1-25;

<sup>33</sup> Attalides, *op.cit.*, 111-112.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> On Makarios' view of socialism and the equalitarian role of the Church, see the interview he gave while in New York a little before he returned to Cyprus in December 1974, to Italian journalist Orianna Falaci, *Interview with History*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), pp. 327-328.

<sup>36</sup> The White House, National Security Action Memorandum, No. 71., August 22, 1961 (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, Secret).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), p. 90.

<sup>40</sup> See National Security Action Memorandum, No. 71.

<sup>41</sup> Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (L.D. Battle) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). Washington, September 7, 1961 (Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 NSAM 71. Secret).

<sup>42</sup> See Peter Calvocoressi, "Britain and the Middle East," in Paul Hammond and Sidney Alexander, editors, *Political Dynamics in the Middle East* (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc.), p. 442.

<sup>43</sup> O'Malley and Craig, pp. x-xi.

<sup>44</sup> O'Malley and Craig, *op.cit.*, pp. 45-47.

<sup>45</sup> See the well documented analysis of James M. Boughton, "Northwest of Suez: The 1956 Crisis and the IMF." International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, Washington, DC, December 2000, pp. 12-26 and specifically p. 19.

<sup>46</sup> O'Malley and Craig, *op.cit.*, pp. 41-42; Holland, *op.cit.*, p. 146.

<sup>47</sup> O'Malley and Craig, *op.cit.* p. 64.

<sup>48</sup> The last remnants of British military presence in the Middle East were found in Aden up until the mid-1960s. By November 30, 1967, the last British troops left Aden which came to be known as South Yemen.

<sup>49</sup> John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, National Security Files, National Security Action Memorandum No. 98, September 25, 1961.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> O'Malley and Craig, op.cit., pp. 46-47.

<sup>52</sup> Public Papers of the President's of the United States, John F. Kennedy, January 20 — December 1961 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962) p. 283

<sup>53</sup> John Kennedy as well as his brother Robert who was serving as Attorney General at the time, found great inspiration in the classics. See Harris Wofford, *Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1989), pp. 386-387.

<sup>54</sup> See Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting of the Prime Minister with the President, April 19, 1961. Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 336, CF 1836. Confidential.

<sup>55</sup> See "Remarks of Welcome to Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, at the Washington National Airport," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office: 1962-1964), pp. 449-450.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> For the White House meeting between Presidents Kennedy and Makarios see Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting Between the President and Archbishop Makarios Washington, June 6, 1963, 2:15 p.m., in Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, Secret.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> *Apanta*, Makarios III, pp. 300, 305-306. (Translation by the author).

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. p. 308.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. p. 312.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., pp. 312-313

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> On Vice President Johnson's meeting with Makarios, see Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, September 3, 1962, 5 p.m. Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-JO9-362. Secret. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.

<sup>70</sup> *Apanta*, Makarios III, p. 283.

<sup>71</sup> For a detailed account of Makarios' decision to propose amendment of the constitution and the overall political dynamic that led to it, see Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition* (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989). Of particular importance is Chapter VIII: The unworkability of the Constitution and the Greek Cypriot demand for constitutional amendments, pp. 127-148. Also Chapter IX: Makarios orients himself toward

the idea of constitutional amendments, pp. 149-202. This is an especially important account, since Glafkos Clerides was the Speaker of the House of Representatives, was a very close aide to Makarios and was intimately involved in the whole process leading to the proposals to amend the Constitution.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., pp. 150, 163-173, 194-195.

<sup>73</sup> Quoted in Demetrios Bitsios, *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975), p. 123.

<sup>74</sup> Averoff's letter is found in Evangelos Averoff, *Lost Opportunities* (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Karatzas, Publisher, 1986) pp. 427-430.

<sup>75</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, April 27, 1963 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Secret).

<sup>76</sup> Ambassador Wilkins, discussion with Makarios on June 6, 1963, is described in: Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, Nicosia, June 6, 1963 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens and London).

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Makarios' memorandum is found in Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State, Nicosia, June 21, 1963 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 -5 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London).

<sup>79</sup> See Alan Gitelson, Robert Dudley and Melvin Dubnic, *American Government* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), p. 44.

<sup>80</sup> The White House, National Security Action Memorandum No. 266, Subject: *New Action Program for Cyprus*, October 17, 1963 (Presidential Papers, The Papers of John F. Kennedy, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts).

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 266. Secret.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> See Telegram from the Embassy of Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, October 20, 1963 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens and London).

<sup>86</sup> See above note 14.

<sup>87</sup> See Clerides, op. cit., pp. 194-195.

<sup>88</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State,

Ankara, December 7, 1963 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 Cyp. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Nicosia and repeated to Athens, London and Istanbul).

<sup>89</sup> See Clerides, *op.cit.*, pp. 195-209.

<sup>90</sup> On the creation of the "Green Line," see the account of Glafkos Clerides, who was present when it was drawn, in Clerides, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-232.

<sup>91</sup> In his memoirs, George Ball characterizes Makarios, among others, as "devious" and "bloody minded." Ball also told President Johnson, following his failed mission to Cyprus: "He [Makarios] must be cheating about his age; no one could acquire such a guile in only fifty-one years." See George Ball, *The Past has Another Pattern* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), pp. 343-345.

<sup>92</sup> On the support of the Nixon administration to the Greek junta, see Theodore Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey* (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 51-53; C.M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Colonels* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), pp. 87-111.

<sup>93</sup> See Lawrence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Policy* (New York: New York Times Books, 1977), pp. 111-113; Couloumbis, *op.cit.*, p. 88.

<sup>94</sup> During the July 15, 1974, coup, Makarios survived an attack on the Presidential Palace. He escaped to the mountainous Paphos district in the southwestern part of the island, and from there he was evacuated, on July 16, by a British helicopter, first to the British bases and then to Malta and London. On Makarios' rescue and the divergent views between London and Washington during the July-August 1974 Cyprus crisis, see the memoirs of British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, *Time and Chance* (London: William Collins & Sons, 1987), pp. 337-339, 341, 350-353. See also Chris P. Ioannides, *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis, to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo* (New York: Pella Publishing Co., 2001), pp. 105-138.

<sup>95</sup> On American suspicions of Wilson, see O'Malley and Craig, *op.cit.*, pp. 148-150.

<sup>96</sup> On the White House paralysis and the handling of the 1974 Cyprus Crisis by Henry Kissinger, see Ioannides, *Realpolitik*, pp. 112-114.

<sup>97</sup> For an extensive analysis of the handling of the July-August 1974 Cyprus Crisis by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, see Costas Venizelos and Michael Ignatiou, *Ta Mystika Archeia tou Kissinger: H Apofasi gia ten Dichotomisi tes Kyprou* (Kissinger's Secret Archives: The Decision to Partition Cyprus), Athens: Livanis Press, 2002.

## Revisiting the Cyprus Question: The Challenge and the Promise<sup>1</sup>

Andreas Theophanous

On April 24, 2004, the Greek Cypriots rejected the UN sponsored plan, known as Annan Plan V, by an overwhelming majority of 75.8 per cent. In contrast the Turkish Cypriots (native born and settlers) endorsed it with a 64.9 percent majority. The irony of this outcome was that the Greek Cypriots, who had heavily campaigned for reunification since 1974, had voted to reject the plan while the Turkish side, which traditionally had strong reservations about reunification, endorsed the plan.

Did the Greek Cypriots really change their mind and not wish to share the benefits of accession to the EU as well as their power and economic prosperity with the Turkish Cypriots? If not, what led to the resounding Greek-Cypriot "No" and the simultaneously overwhelming "Yes" by the Turkish voters? This issue can only be addressed within the framework of understanding all the dimensions of the Cyprus question. Two hypotheses have been advanced regarding the essence of that framework.

One hypothesis is that the Cyprus question is essentially one of ethnic conflict between two distinctively different communities that could not find a means to coexist. The *de facto* partition of this island-state is thus the outcome of a particular situation not unique to Cyprus. According to this