

<sup>43</sup> After a cogent analysis of his position, a young English officer who was present was convinced enough to say admiringly: "Damn it all! The beggar is right and I hope we shant have to shoot him" (H.A. Gibbons, *Venizelos*, 2nd ed. [Boston, 1923]).

<sup>44</sup> Κῆρυξ (Herald), 7 December 1901 to 14 March 1903.

<sup>45</sup> He makes this clear in this correspondence with Markantonakis during the Therisso revolt. See Private Archives of Errikos Moatsos. Most important are the letters of 26 April, 6, 11, 13 July, 5 September, 19 October 1905.

<sup>46</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Crète, NS 40, Blanc à Delcassé, 25 Décembre 1900.

<sup>47</sup> "Personne ne pense ici que cet homme ait un masque apparent dissimulant une arrière-pensée toute autre. Son programme et sa conduite sont faciles à définir: Il desire l'annexion mais sans impatience..." Archives de l'Armée, Paris, 7N/85, Lubanski au Ministre de la Guerre, 27 Janvier 1906.

<sup>48</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Crète, NS 34, Blanc à Delcassé, 2 Avril 1901.

<sup>49</sup> This is what Venizelos said about his early career at a banquet given in his honor by the foreign press at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: "After I finished my studies in Athens I returned home and hung my shingle. I had not tried many cases in the court of my home island before it became necessary for me to take up arms against the Turkish government.... I soon reached the point where I had to decide whether I ought to be a lawyer by profession and a revolutionary at intervals or a revolutionary by profession and a lawyer at intervals.... I naturally became a revolutionary by profession." Alastos, op. cit., 38.

<sup>50</sup> *The Merriam-Webster's Dictionary* (New York, 1977), the article 'rebel.'

<sup>51</sup> M. K. Foumis to author. Taped interview, Khania, Crete, August 1981.

<sup>52</sup> Unpublished letter of E. Venizelos to K. Foumis, 26 April 1905. Private Archive of M. K. Foumis.

<sup>53</sup> P. Prevelakis, *Ο Κρητικός* (The Cretan), vol. 2, 460.

<sup>54</sup> H. A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1969), 247.

<sup>55</sup> See the definition of ἀγωνιστής (combatant, competitor in games, master in any art of science, one who struggles), H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, rev. H. Stuart Jones, 9th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1925-40.

## The American Near East Relief (NER) and the *Megali Catastrophe* in 1922

HARRY J. PSOMIADES <sup>1</sup>

### The Destruction of Smyrna

The long awaited Turkish offensive began on August 26, 1922 southwest of Afyonkarahisar, at the most vulnerable point on the Greek front. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Greeks were overcome and within a few days the Turks succeeded in cutting the rail link to Smyrna, occupying Afyonkarahisar and totally disrupting the principal Greek route of communications and supplies. The Greek forces were cut in two and in full retreat. While those in the northern sector, some three divisions, skillfully retreated to the Sea of Marmara and embarked for Greece, the larger concentration of forces, in the southern sector, was completely routed. Disoriented and in disarray, they fled to Smyrna and the coast, accompanied or followed by some 150,000 destitute and panic-stricken refugees from the interior, who, in search of security and sustenance, camped on the city's quay.

In an attempt to calm the population, the Allied consuls of Smyrna gave formal assurances to the Greeks and Armenians that they need not fear for their lives, although they were not prepared to take concrete steps to ensure the safety of the city's civilian population. Only the American Consul General, William Horton, who was an old Near East hand, refused to give such assurances and indeed, on September 4, he cabled the US High Commissioner in Constantinople (Istanbul), Admiral Bristol, "in the interest of humanity and

for the sake of American interests to mediate with Mustapha Kemal [Atatürk] for an amnesty to permit the orderly withdrawal of Greek forces from Anatolia and possibly avoid the destruction of Smyrna."<sup>2</sup> His great concern was who would police the city between the time of the Greek withdrawal and the arrival of the Turks. His plea was essentially ignored by Washington, and instead, three destroyers were sent for the protection of American lives and property.

On September 8, the Greek army completed its evacuation from Smyrna. On the following day, the victorious Turks entered the city and the looting, armed robbery, rape, and killings began. The situation worsened when fire broke out on September 13, and after three days, some two-thirds of Smyrna lay blackened and smoldering. The Armenian, Greek, and European quarters were almost totally destroyed, and those that survived the holocaust were compelled to join the ranks of the refugees on the quay. Without food and water, some 300,000 hapless souls were now so pressed together that "one could not lie down without being crushed to death – women gave birth to still-born babies and sheltered them against their dried-up breasts, for lack of a burial place... waiting for a momentary pathway to open up for them to lay their burdens in the all-receiving sea."<sup>3</sup> In the meantime, the Allied navies (some twenty-one warships – eleven British, five French, two Italian and three American) congregated in Smyrna harbor, unashamedly declared their strict neutrality, and stated that their mission was simply to observe the demise of Hellenism in Asia Minor and to protect the lives and properties of their nationals and consuls. None wanted to give even the appearance that they were siding with the enemy, thus encouraging the Turks to believe that whatever action they took against the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, there would be no interference from the Great Powers.

By September 24, the situation got completely out of hand as Turkish handbills informed the displaced multitude that

those not out of the city within a week's time would be deported to the interior.<sup>4</sup> There was also a report by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon that Nurreddin Pasha, Governor-General of Smyrna, had announced that any refugees remaining in the city after September 30 would be massacred.<sup>5</sup> The dramatic result of these announcements was a further stampede of thousands of people toward the harbor desperately seeking passage to a safe haven. Shortly thereafter, given the refusal of Allied ships to provide passage for the refugees and in order to hasten their departure from Turkish soil, the Angora [Ankara] authorities gave the American relief workers in Smyrna, and Asa Jennings in particular, assurances that Greek ships could come to Smyrna to take the refugees, provided the ships did not fly Greek colors and did not dock at the quay. The Athens government at first feared to release its transports, concerned that the Turks would seize them and use them for an invasion of the Aegean islands, but it finally relented, and on September 24 Greek rescue vessels flying American colors and escorted by American destroyers entered Smyrna harbor. Thus, by October 8, the evacuation of the entire Christian population of Smyrna was completed.<sup>6</sup> A week later the International Red Cross reported that a total of one half-million refugees had reached Greece in wretched condition and that more were on their way.<sup>7</sup> In the thirty days following the Turkish entry into Smyrna over 50,000 Greek and Armenian civilians lost their lives.<sup>8</sup>

Even though the newly established League of Nations (1919) had for the first time provided an international framework to meet the challenges of massive hardships, it was prevented by the Allied powers from playing a major political role which could have alleviated human suffering. They did not wish the League to make political decisions bearing upon their interests, although they were happy to use the League's machinery "for the gradual and orderly evacuation of the Greeks from Eastern Thrace and to examine the

whole question of transfer of population.”<sup>9</sup> While the League bolstered the limited scope and efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), it was clearly the swift and positive response of American philanthropy which saved the day.<sup>10</sup> American efforts to effect emergency relief surpassed all other efforts combined, excepting the Greek.<sup>11</sup>

### The American Near East Relief (NER)

Next to the American Red Cross (ARC), the American Near East Relief (NER) performed the largest service among the foreign relief agencies in rendering aid to the refugees. It was originally formed by a group of men in response to the “systematic oppression and destruction of the Armenian people in Anatolia” in 1915 and was called the American Committee for Armenian Relief. It had several name changes as it steadily expanded the scope of its work and achieved the transition from emergency services following the Armenian massacres in 1915 to a well-developed education and reconstruction program in the post-Lausanne period.<sup>12</sup> Granted a name change and a charter by an act of Congress in 1919, its expanded mission was,

To provide relief and to assist in the repatriation, rehabilitation, and reestablishment of suffering and dependent people of the Near East and adjacent areas; to provide for the care of orphans and widows; and to promote the social, economic, and industrial welfare of those who have been rendered destitute, or [made] dependent directly or indirectly by the vicissitudes of war, the cruelties of their mentors and by other causes beyond their control.

After the armistice of 1918, the NER undertook the care of refugees, particularly of the surviving Armenians who returned from the deportations only to find their homes destroyed and property looted, or their homes and land occupied by Muslims. Although legally bound to assist the Armenians

and the Greeks after the armistice of 1918, the local Turkish authorities and the Allied representatives, who were to enforce the armistice agreements, provided very little, if any, aid to compel the Turks to relinquish the expropriated properties.<sup>13</sup> Thus, the returning Armenians found themselves in an inhospitable environment and were compelled to flee their villages for the security of the larger towns. Unable to support themselves in the urban centers, they became dependent upon American charity, namely, the NER.<sup>14</sup>

For almost three years prior to the Smyrna disaster, the NER developed extensive, life-saving relief projects in Anatolia, Syria, Palestine and the Caucasus.<sup>15</sup> Moreover,

the NER workers had served for some time, along with American missionaries,<sup>16</sup> as the eyes and ears of the Western powers in the vast expanse of Anatolia, manning their soup kitchens, hospitals and orphanages. They witnessed and reported the horrors of the deportations. They were the first non-Greeks to report the systematic extermination and deportation of the Pontic Greeks in 1921 and consequently were placed under a great deal of pressure by the Kemalist authorities to close their orphanages and schools and leave Turkey. In May 1922 NER worker Dr. Ward upset the Kemalists by reporting Armenian massacres “and the death of hundreds of Greek deportees from starvation, thirst, cold, fatigue and ill-treatment.” He also informed his superiors that the Turkish authorities in Harpoot [Harput] had forced him to turn over to them some 500 girls who were above the age limit (over 15 years old) in the Christian orphanages under his care. He was soon expelled from Harpoot.<sup>17</sup> Also in May, NER worker Miss Wood wrote in her diary that during her two weeks journey to the coast she saw every day “groups of deportees, mostly women and children, all starving, and a great number of bodies along the road...and the entire remaining population was being deported without food and clothing...Conditions at Malatia, where the deportees died at the rate of forty or fifty a day, were far worse than in Harpoot.”<sup>18</sup>

At the time of the Smyrna tragedy, only the United States among the major powers gave thought to the refugees; the personnel of various American religious and educational institutions in the city, along with the local YMCA and YWCA, and the American Consulate, organized relief committees and distributed food among the destitute. NER was the only organized relief agency in the Smyrna area. The American Red Cross, providing an initial \$50,000 for relief supplies, soon followed with a US Disaster Relief Committee from Constantinople (Istanbul) arriving in Smyrna shortly before the Turkish nationalist forces entered the city.<sup>19</sup> The team also included a much needed medical team consisting of Esther Lovejoy, the only American and woman doctor, Dr. Wilfred Post, and a British naval surgeon. Their magnificent humanitarian work in caring for, feeding, and transporting the panic-stricken refugees during the Smyrna fire was responsible for saving over 200,000 lives in the Smyrna region alone.<sup>20</sup> Soon after the Smyrna conflagration, NER sought to secure from the Kemalist, or Nationalist, Government assurances of safety for the children of its orphanages in Anatolia. Such assurances failing, NER was forced to leave the country and to remove all of the Christian orphans in its care from Asia Minor to Greece.<sup>21</sup> Thus, in October 1922, a systematic program of evacuation began. Under the care of NER workers, the orphans were brought out by way of the Mediterranean and Black Sea ports of Anatolia, mostly on American ships. The American workers suffered with their charges the privation of a journey of hundreds of miles in severe winter weather over vast stretches of mountains and open plains. By the end of December 1922, NER had transferred 15,644 orphans to Greece.<sup>22</sup> The widely publicized refusal of the Kemalists to provide security guarantees for the orphanages was one more indication that the presence of Greeks and Armenians in Turkey would no longer be tolerated, and that the Turkish movement toward "ethnic cleansing" was irreversible.<sup>23</sup>

In mid-October 1922, the NER reported that there were some 200,000 refugees left in Asia Minor and that they were under enormous pressure by the Turkish authorities, including force and the threat of the use of force, to leave.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, the rising tide of Turkish nationalism, fed by the Turkish victory in the Mudanya armistice negotiations in early October,<sup>25</sup> precipitated another severe refugee crisis by awarding Eastern Thrace to Turkey. It initiated the rapid exodus of almost 300,000 Christians from Eastern Thrace and Constantinople to Greece, and the renewal of the forced eviction of thousands of Greeks and Armenians from their homes in the interior of Anatolia to the coast. The latter were in a particularly dangerous situation. Marooned at Turkish ports or aboard crowded ships, they had to be fed and cared for or left to perish. Since Turkey and, for the most part, the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople, refused to take any responsibility for these refugees, it is appalling to contemplate what would have happened to them if not for the swift response of the NER to provide relief and transportation to places of safety.<sup>26</sup>

The NER also reported that the Christians were told that they had permission or were free to leave Anatolia provided that they did so before November 30, 1922. As on previous occasions when Christians were told that they had permission to leave Turkey, the word "permission" was a euphemism for an order to leave, or else. The Christians were given to understand that by that date if they did not leave they would be deported to internment camps in the interior.<sup>27</sup> A similar order was announced to the surviving deportees, and to the Greek women and children of the Black Sea coast of Anatolia, who had not been exiled, that "within one month... starting on November 1, 1922...they must exit the national boundaries of Turkey."<sup>28</sup> Another order issued by the Turkish authorities to the deported Pontic Greeks interned in the Malatya region of Anatolia read that "those refugees [it called

those deported “refugees”] who went away from their homes [as if they left freely] are free under the condition that they leave the national boundaries.”<sup>29</sup> Turkish methods of intimidation employed varied according to circumstances, “but its methods are fully successful whether it’s called expulsion or permission to depart, the object of the Turks end result is identical...It is interesting to note that the Turks have been careful to avoid giving orders in writing...except by mistake in Zungouldak.”<sup>30</sup> Thus, the surviving Greek population in Turkey, prior to the agreement on a population exchange in late January 1923, after the armistice of Mudanya in mid-October 1922, which presumably ended Greek-Turkish hostilities, continued to be expelled from Turkey, with the usual exception of the majority of the able-bodied men who, having been declared prisoners of war, were sent to the interior to join the infamous labor battalions. For many this spelled death.<sup>31</sup> The lifespan of a Greek or Armenian in a Turkish labor battalion was generally about two months.<sup>32</sup> Young women were also detained and carried off into captivity.<sup>33</sup>

A more widely flung call for the lifeline came with the new wave of mass expulsions following the Smyrna catastrophe. The service stations established by the NER along the routes to sustain the orphans in their flight to Greece and at the ports of embarkation were inevitably called upon to save the lives of adult refugees, who would have perished by the roadside without the nourishment which these temporary kitchens provided. The following telegram urgently dispatched at that time to the New York head office of NER by one of its managing directors tells the sad story of countless thousands of refugees on a tortuous march to an uncertain future.<sup>34</sup>

Extreme cold, snow and storms aggravate the plight of Asia Minor refugees. Death is overtaking thousands of the children and the aged infirm on the frozen roads of Anatolia, aboard the tossing rescue ships in the Black Sea, and in the camps near Constantinople.

Moving over the worst mud roads in the world, I saw a crowd of broken civilians more depressing than an army in hard-pressed retreat. Women about to become mothers tramped in snow up to their knees. Tired children dropped weary by the wayside, and girls of tender years bore men’s burdens.

To save these refugees, NER began to feed them at the Black Sea ports of embarkation of Samsun, Ordu, and Trebizond [Trabzon], as well as at the Mediterranean port of Mersin. Although NER provided a minimum ration for them,<sup>35</sup> the death toll at these ports remained extremely high.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, many refugees also died of illness and disease onboard overcrowded rescue ships. In the refugee camps at Constantinople alone, particularly at the notorious Selimiyeh Barracks, which was the first stopover for most of the refugees from the Black Sea ports, between 40 and 300 people died daily. One observer described it as a veritable morgue.<sup>37</sup> Admiral Bristol, in his official report to Washington in July 1923, stated that, without NER activities in the Pontos and Constantinople an additional 100,000 refugees would undoubtedly have perished of hunger and disease.<sup>38</sup>

### **The Movement toward a Population Exchange**

The mission of all the relief agencies in the refugee crisis was to save lives, not to extend relief indefinitely, nor to assume the primary burden of making the refugees self-sufficient. The latter was beyond their resources and mandate, and raised a critical political question – where should the refugees be settled permanently so that they could regain their ability to be self-supporting? Consequently, by the end of October, the relief agencies had informed the League of Nations and the three Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople that relief could not be extended indefinitely to the refugees and that they should start thinking of a permanent solution for the refugee predicament. In the

discussions that ensued they expressed the belief that, since Turkey would not allow the refugees to return to their homes in safety and no one was prepared to force them to do so, the most likely solution to the problem would be the permanent settlement of the refugees on Greek soil and/or some kind of a Greek-Turkish population exchange.<sup>39</sup> Any notion of the possibility of autonomous areas for minorities within the Turkish state, areas to which the exiles could return with some semblance of security, or other special provisions for the protection of minorities were completely unacceptable to the Turkish leadership,<sup>40</sup> and therefore to the Great Powers and the refugees themselves. The defeat of Greek arms in Anatolia, the procrastination, rivalry, and indifference of the Entente powers and the triumph of a Turkish nationalism bent on creating a homogeneous Turkish nation-state could not be ignored or denied. These facts were obviously on the minds of those whose task it was to find a solution to the refugee problem – a problem which threatened the peace and stability of the Balkan-eastern Mediterranean region, and indeed, the very survival of an impoverished and politically turbulent Greek state.

In conclusion, the international relief agencies were a primary source of intelligence on conditions in Turkish-controlled territory. They often provided the Entente powers with the only reliable information on the treatment and displacement of the native Christian population in Anatolia. Their fundraising efforts for Near East relief and the many eyewitness media accounts of conditions in Turkey by relief workers also aroused international public opinion, particularly in the United States, where they were often an embarrassment to Washington, exerting additional pressure on governments to act expeditiously on behalf of the refugees. Yet, by taking the initiative in providing timely humanitarian assistance and saving countless lives, the relief agencies unwittingly relieved the reluctant Allied powers of their responsibility

toward the refugees, at least until after the bulk of the refugees had been evicted, or had fled from their homes in fear and were expelled or transferred to Greece. Indeed, Allied and American reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of a resurgent Turkey in order to secure economic advantage along with the successful work of the international relief agencies encouraged the Turkish Nationalists to expedite their plans for “ethnic cleansing” by minimizing the risk of international intervention, and by relieving the international community of any responsibility for the welfare of the refugees, in the unlikely event that they were so inclined. In other words, the international relief agencies became the unwilling accomplices of Turkey for ethnic cleansing. But the alternative was no less ghastly. One shudders to think what would have happened if American philanthropy and the foreign relief agencies had not provided timely humanitarian assistance.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Harry J. Psomiades is professor emeritus of political science at Queens College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.

<sup>2</sup> Louis P. Cassimatis, *American Influence in Greece, 1917-1929* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1988), 111; Marjorie Housepian, *The Smyrna Affair* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1966), 94-96; and George Horton, *The Blight of Asia* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1926).

<sup>3</sup> Melville Chater, “History’s Greatest Trek,” *The National Geographic Magazine*, XLVIII, 5 (November, 1925), 539.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 539-540; Housepian, *op. cit.*, 97; and Edward Hale Bierstadt, *The Great Betrayal* (New York: Robert M. McBride & Co., 1924), 56-87.

<sup>5</sup> *British Secretary’s Notes of a Conference between French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, held at the Quai d’Orsay*, September 22, 1922. Doc. 48. [E 9843/27/44].

<sup>6</sup> Melville Chater, *op. cit.*, 535-540; Michael L. Smith, *Ionian Vision* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), 306-311; Housepian, *op. cit.*, 175-185; and William T. Ellis, “Jennings of Smyrna,” *Scribner’s* (August 1928), 230-

235.

<sup>7</sup> *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922), 48/24380/24357, October 17, 1922.<sup>8</sup> The American Consul General George Horton estimated the figure closer to 100,000. See Housepian, *op.cit.*, 258-259.<sup>9</sup> Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon, October 16, 1922, Doc. 126. [E 11167/27/44].<sup>10</sup> Louis P. Cassimatis, *op. cit.*, 110-117; Dimitra M. Giannuli, *American Philanthropy in the Near East: Relief to the Ottoman Greek Refugees, 1922-1923* (Ph.D. Diss., Kent State University, 1992); *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 48/24722/24357, "Nansen Report: Refugees in Greece and Asia Minor," Part II (Geneva), 18 November 1922, 4; and Areti Tounda-Fergadi, "L'histoire de l'emprunt accorde pour les réfugiés de 1924," *Balkan Studies* 21 (1983), 90-91.<sup>11</sup> The American Red Cross (ARC) fed and cared for over 700,000 refugees in Greece from October 1922 to April 1923. The American Women's Hospital organized 33 medical stations and hospitals. Also active in Greek relief were the YMCA and YWCA, the American Foreign Missions Board, the Anglo-American Committee of Salonika, and the Athens American Relief Committee. In addition to governments, the Greek Red Cross and private Greek initiatives, the European relief committees at work in Greece from October 1922 to June 1923 included the British Red Cross, the British Relief Committee, Save the Children Fund (UK) (which distributed over 50,000 rations to children and adults), Action Suisse, Union internationale de secours aux enfants, the League of Nations' Epidemic Commission, and others, including Swiss, Swedish and Dutch groups in Athens. See Apostolos Doxiadès, "La situation des réfugiés en Grèce," *RICR*, 6th year, no. 47 (August 1924), 724-734; Rodolphe de Reding-Biberegg, "Secours aux réfugiés," *RICR*, 4th year, no. 47 (November 1922), 951-960; and Louis P. Cassimatis, *op. cit.*, 117-119, 126-134.<sup>12</sup> NER had done its work under different names: The American Committee for Armenian Relief, September 16, 1915 to November 20, 1915; the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, November 20, 1915 to June 27, 1918; the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, June 27, 1918 to August 6, 1919; the Near East Relief, the name by which it was incorporated by Congress on August 6, 1919. In 1930, Near East Relief became the Near East Foundation.<sup>13</sup> Ralph F. Chesbrough (Trebizond) to the US Department of State (August 3, 1919), NA 867.00/00.923.<sup>14</sup> The same problem occurred with the returning Greek deportees, especially those from Pontos, but they were cared for by local Greek philanthropy and to some extent by the Greek Red Cross in the towns of the

Pontic coast from Samsun to Trebizond.

<sup>15</sup> *American Near East Relief Activities in Greece*, 1; James L. Barton, *Story of Near East Relief, 1915-1930: An Interpretation* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930); and Mark A Ward, *The Deportations of Asia Minor, 1921-1922* (London, 1922). See also the Reports of the Near East Relief for the years ending 1920-1927.<sup>16</sup> During most of World War I, the United States was neutral and therefore the American missionaries were allowed to remain in Turkey and to provide relief to the Armenians. For their reports on the deportations and persecutions of the Christians, especially of the Armenian massacres of 1915, see The Archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University. See also Suzanne Elizabeth Moranian, "Bearing Witness: The Missionary Archives as Evidence of the Armenian Genocide," in *The Armenian Genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 103-128; Zenovia Lithoxou-Salata, "Paidekes anamniseis" (Childhood memories), in *Pontiaki Stoa (1972-1974)* (Athens: Panpontiakis Enoseos, 1974), 245-258. Many of the missionaries stayed on after the war or returned to Turkey to work with the Near East Relief organization.<sup>17</sup> Admiral Bristol vouched for the authenticity of his reporting in his diary. See Bristol's Diary entries for May 22 and 23, 1922, NA 867.00/1581; and Bristol (Constantinople) to Hughes, October 3, 1921, NA 967.00/1500. See also *Memorandum by Mr. Rendel on Turkish Atrocities between March to October 1922*. [E11885/10524/44] FO 371/7960, Foreign Office, October 30, 1922, 2; and Mark H. Ward, *The Deportations in Asia Minor, 1921-1922* (London, 1922). For the Ottoman policy of the deportation of the Armenians, see Leslie A. Davis, *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917*, ed. Susan K. Blair (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989).<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.<sup>19</sup> Both organizations were actively involved in relief efforts in Constantinople. From February 1919 they used that city as a base from which to feed most of the Caucasian and Armenian refugees. See Briton Cooper Busch, *op.cit.*, 65. Conforming to a decision of President Harding of the United States and a resolution of the Central Committee of the ARC, the American Red Cross, on October 9, 1922, had taken complete charge of the American operations of relief in the Near East, in cooperation with the American Near East Relief. See the Red Cross Courier, 14 October 1922; the *Report of the Near East Relief for the Year Ending 31 December 1922*; and Charles B. Eddy, *Greece and the Greek Refugees* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931), 53-54.

<sup>20</sup> *Report for Near East Relief for the Year ending December 31, 1922*, 4-6; and René Puaux, *La mort de Smyrne* (Paris, 1922), 30-35. American nationals involved in the relief effort were Admiral Bristol, Consul General Horton, the staff of the American College, and the local representatives of American relief organizations and commercial firms.

<sup>21</sup> *Report of Near East Relief for the Year Ending December 31, 1922*, 3.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 21. It was also caring for another 14,000 orphans in Constantinople. See also *American Near East Relief Activities in Greece* (September 1922 - December 1924), 2-13. Two American workers lost their lives in this movement of orphans – one died of pneumonia induced by exposure, the second was shot by bandits. The total number of children being cared for by NER exceeded 115,000. This figure includes orphans and children whose parents were unable to care for them. See *Report of Near East Relief for the Year Ending December 31, 1922*, 28-36.

<sup>23</sup> *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922) 48/24722/24357, November 18, 1922.

<sup>24</sup> *RICR*, 4th year, no. 48 (December 1922), 920-924; and telegram Henderson (Constantinople) to the Foreign Office [E 13187], FO 371/7960, November 26, 1922.

<sup>25</sup> Harry J. Psomiades, "Thrace and the Armistice of Mudanya, October 3-11, 1922," *Bulletin of the Center for Asia Minor Studies* 12 (1997-1998), 213-255.

<sup>26</sup> See the Reports of the Near East Relief for the years ending 1923 and 1926.

<sup>27</sup> Henderson (Constantinople) to Foreign Office, FO 371/7960, E 13187, November 26, 1922. Henderson was the British Acting High Commissioner in Constantinople.

<sup>28</sup> *Report of the Near East Relief for the Year Ending December 31, 1922*, 25-26. See also Iordanis Enepekides, *O Golgotha ton ellinon tou Pontou* (The Golgotha of the Greeks of Pontos) (Athens: Panpontiakis Enoseos, 1976), 121-130; and Yiannis Kapsis, *1922: I mavri vivlos* (1922: The black book) (Athens: Nea Smyrnis, 1992), 17-131.

<sup>29</sup> Savvas P. Ioakimides, *Symvoli eis tin genikin istorian tou Pontou, 1922-1924* (Contributions to the general history of Pontos, 1922-1924) (Athens, 1970), 186.

<sup>30</sup> Henderson (Constantinople) to Foreign Office, FO 371/7960, E 13187, November 26, 1922.

<sup>31</sup> Michael L. Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), 318-319; Dimitrios A. Fillizis, *Oi telestaias imeres tis Trapezountas, 1918-1923* (The last days of trebizond, 1918-1923) (Thessaloniki: Kyriakides, 1982), 56; *Memorandum by Mr. Rendel on the Situation of the Refugees in Greece*, No. 202 [E 12845/10524/44] Foreign Office, November 17, 1922; and Extracts from Col. Rawlinson's

Diary: *Journey from Erzerum to Trebizond, October 5th - 14th 1922*, in FO 371/7878, Y/P 9206.

<sup>32</sup> *Memorandum by Mr. Rendel on Turkish Atrocities between March and October 1922*, 1; and Henry Morgenthau, *An International Drama*, (London: Jarrolds, 1929), 29.

<sup>33</sup> *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922) 48/24929/24357, November 15, 1922. *The Work of Doctor Nansen Concerning the Organization of Aide to Refugees in the Near East*. Also, *The Daily Telegraph* (London), October 10, 1922.

<sup>34</sup> Jacquith (Constantinople) to Vickrey (New York), December 16, 1922, in *American Near East Relief Activities in Greece*, 2. See also H.C. Jacquith, "America's Aid to 1,000,000 Near East Refugees," *Current History*, 33:3 (1924), 403; and C.A. Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League* (London: League of Nations Union, 1931), 77.

<sup>35</sup> *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922) 48/149382/4938, 19 October 1923. Childs (Constantinople) to High Commission for Refugees (Geneva).

<sup>36</sup> Dimitrios A. Fillizis, *Oi telestaias imeres tis Trapezountas, 1918-1923* (The last days of trebizond, 1918-1923) (Thessaloniki: Kyriakides, 1982), 54-55; and Vlasi Agtzidis, *Pontiakos Ellenismos: apo ti genoktonia kai to stalinismo stin perestroika* (Pontic Hellenism: From the genocide and Stalinism to Perestroika), 2nd printing (Thessaloniki: Kyriakides, 1991), 26-30.

<sup>37</sup> Pavlos Hairopoulos, *Eisagogika stoiheia Pontiakis istorias kai laografias* (Introduction to Pontic history and folklore) (Thessaloniki: Kyriakides, 1992), 91; *American Near East Relief Activities in Greece* (September, 1922 - December, 1924), 1; and Melville Chater, "History's Greatest Trek," *National Geographic Magazine*, XLVIII, 5 (November 1925), 559. Also, for the ordeal in Pontos, see Fermanoglu (Constantinople) to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 October 1922, AYE/1922 /AAK (13) Pontos.

<sup>38</sup> *Near East Relief Activities in Greece*, 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 960, and *American Near East Relief Activities in Greece*, 3.

<sup>40</sup> Smith, op. cit., 302-303. As late as September 7, 1922, the metropolitan of Smyrna wished to establish an autonomous Christian state in the Smyrna region under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan with Venizelos as High Commissioner. At that time, there was even a suggestion of some kind of an autonomous state under the League in Eastern Thrace for the protection of its Christian majority and to serve as a buffer between Greece and Turkey. See Doc. 48, *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference*, September 22, 1922, [E 9843/27/44]. Nansen, the League's High Commissioner for Refugees, tried on several occasions, only to be adamantly rebuffed, to get the Nationalist Government to set up an

autonomous district in eastern Anatolia for the few remaining Armenian survivors.

### **The Contribution of the Church Fathers to the Preservation of the Classical Tradition**

MARIA C. PANTELIA

This is a revised version of a lecture delivered at the 2002 Celebration of Greek Letters on the occasion of the Feast Day of the Three Hierarchs in New York. At the time, George Pilitsis was Director of the Archdiocesan Department of Greek Education. I called George from the airport on my way to New York to find out whether he was planning to attend. From the tone of his voice I knew that something was wrong. At first he expressed regrets but finally broke down and told me that he could not attend the Day of Letters because he was scheduled to have major medical tests. A week later he would undergo surgery.

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Ancient Greece produced an immense volume of writing that recorded the birth and development of Western literature, science, drama, philosophy, and other areas of human endeavor. The Homeric epics, the works of Plato and Aristotle, classical Greek drama, the New Testament, the writings of the Eastern Church Fathers and the Justinian legal corpus are only a few examples of the Greek heritage. Despite the influence that ancient Greek literature has exerted throughout the centuries, only a very small portion of it – an estimated 3-5% – survives today. Most ancient texts are lost and what remains is widely scattered, written on fragile papyri and medieval manuscripts, and often difficult to