

ing the Apostate Tyrant As His Tool," "From A Good Root," and "The Tomb of Your Remains," Transcription and Introduction by Diane Touliatos, (Bryn Mawr: Hildegard Publishing Company, 1996); idem., *Kassia (b.810), THIRTEEN HYMNS: Five Hymns to the Great Martyr St. Christina: Hymn to the Pious Pelagia; The Fallen Woman; Augustus the Monarch; Let Us Praise Peter and Paul; Now the Voice of Isaiah the Prophet; The Five-stringed Lute and Fivefold Lamp; Above the Teachings of the Greeks; Edessa Rejoices*, Bryn Mawr, PA: Hildegard Publishing Co., 2000.

The "Domino Effect": Image and Reality in the Balkans

S. J. RAPHALIDES

The scenario of a "domino effect" in the Balkans, first articulated with any seriousness in the early 1990s in the United States, has evolved as the dominant perspective underpinning America's policy in the region.¹ The cast of characters in its presentation over the years has included President Clinton, various cabinet members, as well as members of the congress.² Several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have echoed it since.³ Simply put, the scenario reads: If violence increases in any one Balkan state, its conflict could spread to a neighboring state. Since most Balkan states have conflictive territorial claims, chaos in any one state could encourage other states to join a war.

I argue in this brief essay that the assumptions upon which the scenario rests are flawed, that violence increasing in "X" or chaos in "Y" alone is not sufficient to predict a "domino effect." Certainly not at this point in time or in the near future, in which we see other Balkan states joining a war for territorial gain, to protect co-religionists or co-nationals, with the end result being a war between NATO allies—Greece and Turkey. I begin with a glimpse of the geopolitical landscape and question the assumptions upon which the scenario is based, consider the persuasiveness of the scenario, and conclude with an evaluation of the rationale underpinning the "domino effect" in the Balkans.

Describing the geopolitical landscape

The geopolitical landscape may be viewed descriptively as three concentric circles: inner, middle and outer. Although a concentric model offers insights of the complex Balkan landscape, it has obvious analytical limitations. Nevertheless it allows greater approximation of regional political realities, as indicated by shifting flash points especially of the inner and middle circles, and in accommodating changes in situations and state roles from one circle to another, when either divergent or convergent interests manifest conflictive policies.

The inner circle comprises any state or territory of a state in which armed conflict currently exists or recently has taken place. The flash point may shift, for example, as in the case of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The middle circle comprises two groups of regional actors: those whose interests can be defined as historically imperial, and those who have been the objects of imperialism. To be sure, several states crosscut the categories but all actors presently define some form, or level, of (national) interest in events and outcomes. In the former group, Germany, France, Great Britain, Russia and Turkey are representative. The latter include Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and the successor states of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The outer circle comprises the United States and the principal powers of the European Union who collectively formed the so-called contact states in the Kosovo war—(excepting Russia) Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy—and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁴ The region's historical record of volatility⁵ politically gives differential significance to the terms "stability" and "settlement." In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, what often appeared as "settlement" proved otherwise and frequently gave rise to new forms of instability.⁶

In today's environment stability is subscribed to by all actors, in lesser or greater degree.⁷ For example, whatever the differences between Greece and Macedonia (or FYROM, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as the Greeks officially call it) the political independence and stability of Macedonia is of vital interest to the Greek state.⁸ Stability, however, is foremost an interest of the powers of the outer circle that, in pursuing it, impose a type of

"objectivity," even if conditional and strategically contingent upon circumstances.⁹

Criteria for evaluating the actors and formula

The theoretical framework includes the following Balkan states in the geopolitical landscape: Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Greece and Turkey.¹⁰ In evaluating the scenario's formula, each actor is rated "low," "moderate," or "high," in approximating "X", "Y", or another designation.¹¹ The specified factors as to what constitutes each distinct designation are aggregated and linked to the formula. They are: (1) the strength or weakness of the state, (2) the level of ethnic integration or differentiation, (3) nationalism manifesting irredentist claims, (4) current or recent conflict, (5) quality of political leadership, (6) military capacity, and (7) level of economic development.

They are not without criticism as causal or effecting changes in other actors. The difficulty, theoretically, is in the fact that events and outcomes can be influenced in multiple ways. Short of a single defining factor, one way to cope with the problem is to treat flashpoints "X" and "Y" with analytically distinct parameters in any number of scenarios in different timetables. With regard to the specific scenario at hand, each actor is evaluated above or below which a value of the dependent variable (whose action the theory seeks to explain) indicates an actor approximates. If the prospect of Slovenia as "X" or "Y" appears very low, then Slovenia is scaled low. With Romania, too, its recent accord with Hungary (1998) over minority rights gives it a low probability factor in approximating "X" or "Y".¹² Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, rated high as probable flash points "X" or "Y", are scaled low in starting or joining a war for territorial gain. Simply put, they pose no potential military threat to any other state.

Since the collapse of the Enver Hoxha regime, Albania's internal stability has been problematic. The challenge: restoring public order and legitimization of the center's authority.¹³ For Bosnia-Herzegovina, political existence in its current confederated form is requisitely dependent upon NATO's presence and enforcement of the Dayton Accord (1995). In the case of Macedonia, we observe a

regime pursuing a delicate task in balancing construction of a national identity with avoiding ethnic conflict.¹⁴ In short, these three states are too weak politically, economically and militarily to initiate or "to join a war" whatever the cause.

In the domino scenario, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia are presented as the quintessential flash points, "X", for having a high probability factor: that is, "if violence increases, 'X's' [domestic] conflict could spread to neighboring 'Y'," making the "neighboring 'Y' the next 'X.'" If the flash point shifts, as was the case with Yugoslavia's Kosovo, then conceivably Yugoslavia becomes "X" (Montenegro?) or is instrumental in making its neighbors "Y". The comparison with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia ends, however, when we consider Yugoslavia's capacity to militarily initiate or "to join a war,"¹⁵ even with NATO's bombing actions.

Yugoslavia is a pivotal actor. Although its external actions are constrained by NATO, there is support within the community of European states for its continued integrity as a state, even as they continue to seek a political means to assuage Albanian nationalists in Kosovo short of separation. A resonant spillover of the conflict in Kosovo predicts a break-up of Macedonia and the erosion of any semblance of stability in Albania, especially if we attach significance to the KLA's long-term goal of a "Greater Albania."¹⁶

While irredentist claims have been a part of one or another actor's composite for some time, the fact of the matter is that the adjective "greater" is conditional, even if recurring, among today's Balkan nationalists of whatever ethnic group. This is why the recent conflict in Kosovo, despite its condemnation earlier by the Euro-Atlantic community and NATO's well-publicized posturing exercises in adjacent Albania and Macedonia, in June and July of 1998, with its adjunct threat of intervention,¹⁷ followed-up by bombing and subsequent occupation in 1999, is eclipsed by the reality of consensus for a political solution. A conundrum, to be sure, for separatist nationalism¹⁸ unbridled could be consequentially problematic for a number of Europe's heterogeneous states, even in Western Europe.

Bulgaria is scaled low as "X," but becomes suspect contingent, partly, upon events in Macedonia. In other words, if Macedonia

became "X" or "Y," with territorial designs acted upon by its neighbors—Albania, Yugoslavia (Serbia) and Greece, then a logical assumption is that Bulgaria would act. However, given the circumstance in Europe, the profile of Albania, NATO's constraint of Yugoslavia, the position of Greece, and the United Nations presence in Macedonia, it appears unlikely of such a scenario developing. Rather a plausible assumption for the present would premise Bulgaria's rapprochement with Greece and Turkey, its recognition of the political state Macedonia (if not its ethnic or linguistic identity), as-well-as its commitment to solving bilateral and regional differences politically, and the state's transition to democracy.¹⁹ Bulgaria, too, actively seeks membership in NATO and the European Union which suggests a low probability factor for Bulgaria becoming flash point "X" or a state "joining in a war."

Croatia, like its antagonist Serbia, possesses the capacity to initiate or join a war. Its nationalism, too, is of equal pitch. Despite the reintegration of the Krajina region, Western and Eastern Slavonia, and resultant ethnic cleansing substantially reducing the probability of Croatia becoming an "X" or "Y" sharp differences remain principally with Yugoslavia (Serbia) and with Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we suspend the reality of constraint imposed on Yugoslavia's external behavior and the presence of NATO forces, then a moderate to high probability of renewed conflict with Yugoslavia appears likely over Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, presumably, both Zagreb and Belgrade would act to preserve their "historical" claims and interests, circumstances permitting.²⁰ However, with the death recently of President Franjo Tudjman and the January 2d and 3rd (2000) electoral defeat of his party, the Croatian Democratic Union, which has dominated the country since 1990 and led it to independence in 1991, the prospects for change in the country's nationalist and isolationist politics has improved substantially.²¹

This brings us to the two Balkan actors whose economy and military capabilities are the most formidable: Greece and Turkey.²² Both states are NATO members and have bilateral treaties with the United States. For example, American military aid to Turkey exceeded \$9 billion and to Greece exceeded \$5 billion between 1947 and 1991.²³ "Even within the NATO family," Monteagle Sterns observes, "political factors have played an important role in decid-

ing who gets what and in what proportion. The most questionable hypothesis underlying [America's] Greek and Turkish aid programs is not the ratio, which after all, reflects the reality of their troubled relations, but the pretence that [the United States] has been arming them against an outside threat rather than against each other."²⁴ Greece enjoys membership in the European Union and Turkey associate status in its custom union, and seeks full membership.²⁵

While Turkey clearly possesses an overall military advantage, that advantage is short lived, since neither state could successfully impose a military solution to bilateral problems. Each actor's capacity to initiate or join in war is high, but war between them would be of limited duration and equally costly—economically and politically. Still, when it comes to defining vital national interests involving territorial or security issues, cost may not be a factor in either state's willingness to act once the decision was made.

Turkey's internal situation is most problematic, although relative to the Balkan scenario it is an unlikely prospect of becoming an "X" or "Y." Consequently, Turkey and Greece assume the other designation: joining a war. The question pertinent to the domino effect—subtractive of diplomatic, humanitarian or material aid—is: Given the reality of intensely conflictive bilateral territorial and security issues over the Aegean and Cyprus, would either Greece or Turkey expend vital assets in a Balkan flash point such as Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia? Worded somewhat differently: To what extent would either Greece or Turkey go seeking to influence events and outcomes in Balkan matters?

If we discount the new diplomatic trajectory in their bilateral relations since the recent earthquake each nation experienced, the idea of expending vital assets minus a perceived threat to the national interest appears highly unlikely. "Turkey and Greece will snarl at each other across the Aegean," *The Economist* concludes in its 1999 assessment, "but barking rather than biting should remain the order of the day."²⁶ With the capture of Abdullah Ocalan by Turkey, the lifting of Greek obstructionism over EU economic aid and Turkey's application for EU membership, even snarling is seemingly temporized. In short, circumstances both limit and constrain Greece and Turkey in their attempts to influence events and outcomes in Balkan matters.

At the least, the assumptions supporting the formula of United States policy in the Balkan region are debatable precisely because they attempt to exclude some possibilities as a general matter in favor of others.²⁷ During the conflict in Bosnia, for example, co-religionist factors were cited frequently for Greece and Turkey joining in war in support of one side over the others. A similar rationale was offered in the case of Macedonia, even when Greece put in place its nationalist—frenzy inspired—political and economic policies against the regime, in Skopje. The effect: A United Nations sponsored observation force, with United States participation. Today it is credited with preventing any spillover from neighboring states and drawing in Greece and Turkey. Ironically in this instance Greek and Turkish interests in Macedonia's sovereignty (1992), once established, converged rather than diverged. However, in using the conflict in Kosovo, American policy-makers were able to construct a cohesive argument over the prospect of war drawing in Greece and Turkey.

Conclusion

From the discussion thus far, several ideas can be advanced. First, Greece and Turkey are the least likely to fit the formula's categories "X" or "Y." Second, both states have modern formidable military forces and, relative to the Balkan region, sizeable economies. Third, it is reasonable to assume that neither state would commit its assets in a manner prescribed by the domino formula, even as they compete to influence Balkan events and outcomes. Lastly, the bilateral differences between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean and Cyprus are simultaneously powerful constraints, when it comes to Balkan conflicts that do not engage the states directly, and issues that potentially can bring them to the precipice of war.²⁸

To reinforce the perspective advanced here, let us restate the scenario with an inverse proposition. If Greece and Turkey engage directly in war over a bilateral issue, then other Balkan states would be drawn into the conflict. In other words, suggesting a domino effect with the more powerful actors encouraging and spreading conflict. Consider today's Europe, today's Balkan region, and the calculus of ability and probability of Albania joining Turkey or the

former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia joining Greece in war.

If the prospect of a domino effect bringing war between Greece and Turkey is probabilistically low, then what explains its continuing invocation whenever stability in the Balkans appears threatened? There are several factors that bring transparency to bear in understanding United States policy. First, participation in NATO's war in Kosovo demanded adjunct justification politically to complement the humanitarian and stability issues that were residual of civil war earlier in Yugoslavia. This, in turn, created NATO's credibility issue. Consequently, the Clinton Administration was compelled, given the challenge to its credibility and American leadership of NATO by the Yugoslav regime, to mobilize support for its policy.

Any truly successful foreign policy initiative in the United States politically requires public support as well as that of the Congress. In the waning months of the Bush Administration, stability defined continuing diplomatic support of a federal Yugoslavia undergoing fragmentation. Early on the Clinton Administration defined a need to restore America's somewhat tarnished international image in wake of its interventionist experiences in Somalia and Haiti and to reassert a leadership role and reinvigorate NATO following the termination of the Soviet Union.²⁹ Since the United States had no vital interest in Yugoslavia, certainly not since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kosovo initiative was rationalized along strategic lines.

Against this background, the retrograde domino formula provided a simplistic—and apparently convincing—linear analysis starting with Slovenia's independence struggle and ending with the prospect of war between Greece and Turkey. Its adoption and popularization by the Clinton Administration reinforced the idea that, if the United States did not intervene in Kosovo, then instability in Europe, NATO unity and its very *raison d'être*, as well as America's leadership and credibility would have been compromised. There is in all this a contemptuous indifference to Balkan realities, as well as a subtext linkage to Samuel P. Huntington's thesis of clashing civilizations (enter Iran, Libya and Russia).

NOTES

¹ An example of the American perspective was presented by former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke, in an interview, in *Europe* (December/January 1994-95), pp. 10-12.

² United States Senators John Warner (R) of Virginia and Joseph Lieberman (D) of Connecticut, after a briefing on the Kosovo crisis by Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen, appearing together on the PBS News Hour. Senator Warner described the possible spreading of the conflict to Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia and, consequently, to war between Greece and Turkey. *Nightly News Hour with Jim Lederer*. PBS. WNET, New York, 1 October 1998.

³ Both Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain and Joschka Fisher, Germany's Foreign Minister, have echoed the scenario. Fisher most recently: Fisher, Joschka. *Interview. Charlie Rose*. PBS. WNET, New York. 5 Nov. 1999.

⁴ At a Foreign Minister's meeting of southeastern Europe, in Bonn, Germany, March 25, 1998, to discuss Kosovo, an expression of importance was made for a dialogue on a bilateral basis between countries of the region and Contact Group states. The European Union (EU) and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rely upon diplomacy rather than military force. NATO's new "Strategic Concept" introduced in 1991 calls for forces to enable the Alliance to respond effectively to the changing security environment, provide forces and capabilities to deal with a wide spectrum of risks and contingencies: crisis management and crisis prevention operations, peacekeeping and continued defending security and territorial integrity of member states. *NATO Basic Fact Sheet NR5* (January 1996). See, also, *The Economist*, "A Survey of NATO," (April 24, 1999), pp. 1-18.

⁵ For an interesting series of essays on the subject see, F. Stephen Larrabee, ed., *The Volatile Powder Keg* (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1994). Also, Thanos Veremis, *Greece's Balkan Entanglement* (Athens, Greece: ELIAMEP, 1995), especially "Scholarly Pre-dilections on Balkan Affairs," pp. 115-25.

⁶ See, Nicholas A. Stavrou, "The Balkan Quagmire and the West's Response," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 4:1 (Winter 1993), pp. 24-45. Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1995). Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Balkans* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965). Benjamin Mill and Korina Kagan, "The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era," *International Studies*

Quarterly, 41:1 (March 1997), pp. 51-85.

⁷ Two events illustrate the point. First, the March 25, 1998 meeting of Foreign Ministers of southeastern Europe, in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the crisis in Kosovo underscored the inviolability of borders of the states in the region, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (DOSFAN Home Page.) Second, the recent agreement to create a multinational military force for peacekeeping or aid operations in the Balkans includes the three NATO allies—Italy, Greece and Turkey, as well as Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania. Along with the United States and Slovenia, the seven countries form the Southeastern European Defense Ministerial. On the one hand, the agreement reflects each state's anxiety over any prospective instability in the Balkans. On the other hand, expectations are tempered about the efficacy of such a multinational force because of the tensions that need to be overcome among the consenting states. For instance, the document signed by the Defense Ministers omitted the names of the seven states because of Greece's refusal to recognize the name—Republic of Macedonia. *The New York Times* (September 27, 1998), p. 14.

⁸ See, Nikolaos Zahriadis, "Greek Policy Toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1991-1995," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 14:2 (October 1996), pp. 303-327.

⁹ The most glaring example the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995. It is also a matter of the credibility of NATO. The alliance is the "linchpin of European security" and Kosovo, like the previous flashpoint in Bosnia-Herzegovina, poses a serious challenge to regional stability. See *The Economist* (October 3-9, 1998), pp. 21-22.

¹⁰ Turkey is often cited as in Europe, therefore Balkan, and Middle Eastern. The governments of Slovenia and Croatia do not consider their states as Balkan states.

¹¹ The state, with regard to its characterization as strong or weak, is considered strong if it approximates the process of nation-building: overcoming the "identity crisis;" possesses *legitimacy* by engendering widespread feeling among the people that the regime's rule is rightful; achieves *penetration*, by which the government's writ is effective among all sectors of society and regions; encourage *participation*, in which the people are committed to the electoral and political processes; *distribution of resources*, in which there is some commitment in applying the economic rewards of the nation to the masses. For an explanation of the above concepts developed by Leonard Binder and others see *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

¹² Before the accord, the Hungarian ethnic minority in Romania was described as a "hostage population and bargaining chip" in negotiations between Hungary, with which it ethnically identifies and the sovereign

Romanian state, which often subjected it to substandard treatment. Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 196. Both Hungary and Slovenia are prospective candidates for European Union membership. Talks are expected to formally begin before the end of March 2000. See, "Europe Update," Vol. VIII, No. 1, *Europe*, No. 392, (December 1999/January 2000).

¹³ In place of public order an organized authority, much of Albania's population has resorted to the so-called Canon of Leke, the fifteenth century precepts intended to regulate medieval life among the various clans. Named after Leke Dukagjini, the notions of honor and freedom were valued above honesty, and vengeance made customary. For a recent account of its pervasive use in Albania by people to fill their own needs see, Jane Perlez, "Feuds Rack Albania, Loosed From Communism," *The New York Times* (April 14, 1998), p. A3. See, also, Elez Biberaj, "Albania and the Albanians in the Post-Communist Period," *The Volatile Powder Keg*, F. Stephen Larrabee, ed. (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1994), pp. 27-50. The poverty rate in Albania is estimated at 60% in a climate of continuing political turmoil, lawlessness and pervasive corruption. *The CIA Factbook* (June 10, 1998). Albania's continuing political and socioeconomic difficulties has been vividly presented in Scott Anderson's "The Curse of Blood and Vengeance," *The New York Times Magazine* (December 26, 1999), pp. 28-35, 44, 54-56.

¹⁴ The United Nations has maintained an observation force for peacekeeping purposes in Macedonia, since it declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. In July of 1998, the Security Council renewed its mission and increased the troop level from about 700 to 1,050. The United States contribution currently remains at about 350.

¹⁵ Before the war in Kosovo, Yugoslavia was known to possess 60 surface-to-air missile sites, which include the sophisticated SA-6 system and others capable of reaching highflying planes. In addition, it possessed 241 combat aircraft, MIG 21s and MIG 29s, and 1,850 air defense guns. *The CIA World Fact Book* (June 10, 1998). NATO's account of Yugoslavia's assets destroyed by its bombing campaign is currently in dispute.

¹⁶ There is little known about the KLA other than the goal of Kosovo's separation from Yugoslavia and advancing the idea of a "Greater Albania." For an analysis, see <http://www.STRAFOR.COM>, GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE 22 October 1999.

¹⁷ On September 26, 1998, Christopher Hill, the United States Ambassador to Macedonia, made public the purpose of his meeting with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic—"a stern warning on Kosovo," according to the news byline. Armed with the United Nations Security Council's resolution calling for an end to the fighting, *The New York Times* reports that plan-

ners for NATO have already drafted a series of strikes against the Yugoslav military. They range from limited cruise-missile attacks to an air campaign that could increase in intensity, if warranted. (September 27, 1998), p.14.

¹⁸ See, John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the Modern State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

¹⁹ See, Thanos Veremis, *Greece's Balkan Entanglement* (Athens, Greece, Eliamep, 1995), p. 57. P.C. Ioakimidis, "Greece, the European Union and Southeastern Europe: Past Failures and Future Prospects," in *Greece and The New Balkans*, eds. Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (New York: Pella Publishing, 1999).

²⁰ See, Chris Hedges, *The New York Times* (May 28, 1997), p. A9 and (June 1, 1997), p. E3.

²¹ *The Economist* (January 8-14, 2000), pp. 46,48.

²² According to *The Economist*, "The World in 1999," pp. 72-73: Greece's 1999 GDP: \$124.0 bn., its GDP per capita: \$11,739; Population: 10.6 m; GDP growth rate: 3.2%, Inflation: 4.0%

Turkey's 1999 GDP: 207.5 bn., its GDP per capita: \$3, 159; Population: 65.7 m; GDP growth rate 4.1%, Inflation: 64.7%. Greece's defense expenditures: 4.6% of GDP (1995). Turkey's defense expenditures: 4% of GDP (1995). See, Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos, eds., *Greece and The New Balkans* (New York: Pella Publishing, 1999), Appendix pp. 457,472.

²³ Montea Stearns, *Entangled Allies* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), p. 40.

²⁴ *Ibid.* p.43.

²⁵ Turkey's was given candidate status at the EU's Helsinki, Finland meeting, December 11, 1999.

²⁶ p. 77.

²⁷ For a thoughtful presentation of the general issue of insecurity in international affairs, see, Davis B. Bobrow, "Complex Insecurity: Implications of a Sobering Metaphor," *International Studies Quarterly*, 40:4 (December 1996), PP. 435-450.

²⁸ For example, the most recent incident occurred, in January of 1997, over the uninhabited Aegean Greek islet of Imia. Four years later, Greece and Turkey signed a series of accords that Foreign Minister Ismail Cem of Turkey called signaled "a successful beginning toward a new era in relations between our two countries." *The New York Times* (January 21, 2000), p. A3.

²⁹ Christopher Cviic, "Yugoslavia: The Unmaking of a Federation," *The Volatile Powder Keg*, F. Stephen Larrabee, ed. (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1994), p. 116.

The Adaptation, Acculturation, and Psychological Well-being of Greek Americans in New York City

SAM J. TSEMBERIS
SPYROS D. ORFANOS

For first generation immigrants, leaving Greece is among the most disruptive and stressful of life's events. Individuals and families are severed from their place of origin, national identity, community, family, friends, language and mores. The new country is unfamiliar, the language difficult, the customs foreign. These immigrants suffer from disruptions in attachment of person and place, as well as feelings associated with the loss of home or from nostalgia. A sense of continuity with their past as well as a new sense of belonging is necessary for their psychological well-being (Fullilove, 1996).

In spite of these formidable challenges, over the years, many immigrants to the United States adapt remarkably well to American culture. Studies of immigrant groups typically examine the psychological consequences of prolonged exposure to cultural system's other than one's own (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992). The present study reports on the acculturation and psychological well-being of Greek immigrants to New York City, a group largely overlooked by the empirical literature, and addresses the following questions: What are the variables that are related to successful acculturation? How is acculturation related to psychological well-being? How do different subgroups of immigrants achieve well-being?