

via, 1933 – 1941: *The German Conquest of Yugoslavia* (Boulder, Colorado, 1988), 25 – 35.

⁶² *The Times* (London), 12 Feb. 1934, 11. Also see PRO FO 14495/68 R1130/22/67, Henderson to Simon, 19 Feb. 1934.

⁶³ An example of this view may be found in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 530; and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, 738.

⁶⁴ Geshkoff, 215.

⁶⁵ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, 721 – 722.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 723; Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. 2, 181 – 182. Also see Rothschild, 364 – 365; and Turkes, 133.

⁶⁷ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, 735.

⁶⁸ PRO FO 13966/57 C7661/7467/7, Waterlow to Henderson, 8 Oct. 1930; and PRO FO 13966/72 C8292/7467/7, Waterlow to Henderson, 5 Nov. 1930.

⁶⁹ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, 738; and *Balkan Federation*, 242 – 244.

⁷⁰ PRO FO 14904/102 R1911/34/19, Henderson to Simon, 16 March 1935; and *The Times*, 6 March 1935, 14. For an examination of the March 1935 coup see Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy* (London, 1997), 99 – 133.

⁷¹ *The Times*, 6 March 1935, 14; 8 March 1935, 15, 16.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 7 March 1935, 14.

⁷³ The Turkish government handled the situation very carefully. Ankara's decision to reinforce the Thracian garrison beyond the number of troops permitted by the Treaty of Lausanne was in clear violation of that agreement. When, on 7 March, the Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations complained about Turkey's aggressive moves, the Turkish government officially expressed "great surprise" at the Bulgarians' decision to interpret the reinforcement of Thrace as a sign of Turkish hostility. Turkey claimed that far from constituting a violation of any international agreements, the troop movements were openly initiated the previous year. Concurrently with this statement, however, the Turkish Prime Minister delivered a speech before the Grand National Assembly in which he reaffirmed the Turkish commitment to the Balkan Entente and expressed the desire for an improvement of Turco-Bulgarian relations. See *The Times*, 8 March 1935, 15; 9 March 1935, 12.

⁷⁴ PRO WO 33/1651, as quoted in Brock Millman, "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy, 1934 – 1942," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.31, No.3 (July 1995), 498.

⁷⁵ See Martin Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy, 1940 – 1941: The Balkan Clue* (Cambridge, 1973), 50; and Marshall Lee Miller, *Bulgaria During the Second World War* (Stanford, 1975), 35.

The Silent Confrontation: Greek Shipping in World War II

MATHEOS D. LOS

We were left alone on the ocean, with only the sky and the sea for company. The darkness was still deep and the weather somewhat mild despite the south wind that was blowing... Suddenly, after about an hour, we heard the sound of engines and almost immediately we saw the black mass of the submarine emerging in front of us again. When it neared, a machine gun started firing at us. The bullets fell like hail into the sea and onto our raft. For moment the shooting stopped and the submarine shone a small spotlight to verify that its heinous crime had been completed. The Germans, apparently realizing that the two of us who had remained on the raft had not been killed, threw hand grenades. One of them exploded on the right side of the raft very close to me, causing several large wounds on my shoulder. In spite of the terrible pains I continued to play dead. At the same time the submarine shone the spotlight on the raft again and because they didn't see any movement, it seems they presumed me dead. Then the sound of the engines started again and I saw the submarine moving away. In a little while, however, I heard its guns again. It had closed in on my unfortunate companions who were desperately swimming in the water or clinging on to floating wreckage, speechless. To start with, the fir-

ing of the machine gun was continuous, then it became more sporadic. Clearly, having shot all those who were grouped around the wreckage they were searching for others who were isolated, and shot them too. The massacre lasted all night and when dawn started to break, the shooting stopped. The submarine submerged after making sure it had completed the slaughter.

This is the true eye witness report of Anthony Liosis chief mate of the Greek cargo ship "Peleus" which was torpedoed by a German submarine on the night of March 13, 1944 in the Atlantic, six hundred miles from the coast of Africa. After sinking the cargo ship the captain of submarine thought it wise to wipe out the survivors of the torpedoing so that his own position could not be traced.

That, and innumerable other cases, make up the drama of the sacrifice of the Greek merchant shipping during the Second World War. A drama with the oceans of the world as its stage and with two competitors with entirely different roles and methods as the leading players. On one side was the war machine of Nazi Germany, armed with the most modern lethal weapons of its time. Dominant here were the famous U-boats whose mission was to close the sea lanes used by the Allies for their supplies. On the other side was the allied merchant fleet with vessels of the order of five to ten thousand tons, mostly steamships, with speeds rarely exceeding ten knots, entirely unprotected and manned by totally unarmed seafarers. Their only protection was the alertness and the sea-manship of those manning them, since at least during the early years of the war, the allied convoy escorts were unable to protect them effectively.

The field of action of both protagonists in the drama was mainly the Atlantic Ocean. It was in that area that throughout the war a fight until death, which went down in history as "the Battle of the Atlantic", was carried out. In the early years of the war chasing the allies merchant ships seemed a simple task for the Germans, who called the period from the outbreak of war up to March 1941 "Happy Time". And not without reason. Up to then the total lack of organization and protection of the convoys, as well as information leaks about the departures of ships from America through Swiss co-in-

surers of the cargoes in Zurich, assisted the destructive task of the U-boats tremendously. Later, however, things changed. The Allies realized that the merchant fleet was the "fourth arm" of their war effort and gave top priority to the protection of their convoys. The objective was to keep up the flow of transports to the fronts at all cost – the western front Europe with convoys from North America to the British Isles and the eastern front with similar convoys headed for the Soviet port of Murmansk on the Atlantic Ocean. The North Africa front was served through Gibraltar and Malta and the Southeast Asia front through Suez or round the Cape to India. Finally, the theaters of operations in the Pacific were served from the US west coast and from Australia.

The vital contribution of escort vessels by the Americans – who in the meantime had become actively engaged in the war after Pearl Harbor – the development of radar and sonar technologies, and the breaking of the famous Enigma communication code of the German submarines, changed the rules of the game to such an extent that by the end of the war of the 820 U-boats which the Third Reich had in its service just 102 were left, while of the 39,000 men who manned them only 7,000 survived. At the same time the Americans flooded the oceans with the famous Liberties, those homely but wonderful massproduced 7,200 ton cargo ships that were turned out at a sufficiently rapid rate to counterbalance the losses of ships sunk by the German U-boats. Those ships, 2,742 of them in all, carried 100 million tons of war material during the war. And when the war ended, 100 liberties were made available through the mediation of the American government to Greek shipowners who had lost their fleets during the war. Those ships, which our shipping community called the "blessed Liberties", together with hundreds of others acquired later in the free market, made up the nucleus of the post war Greek merchant marine, which today rules the seas of the world with a fleet of 3,358 vessels of all types and a total capacity of 78.9 million tons.

In the battle of the oceans in World War II the Greek shipping industry marshalled more than 600 ships totaling 1.8 million grt¹, the ninth largest fleet in the World after those of the United Kingdom, the USA, Japan, Norway and other traditional maritime nations². If we add the Greek-owned vessels under the flags of the

United Kingdom and of Panama, the Greek fleet was certainly close to 750 vessels and 2.4 million tons, manned with 20,000 seafarers. Almost all of this fleet was made up of elderly cargoships, with newbuildings representing just a few exceptions and with a cargo capacity not over 10,000 tons per ship. At this point we should also emphasize that in the category of oceangoing cargoships over 2,500 tons – the most suitable to participate in the Allied convoys – in 1937 Greece held second place in the world with over 1.5 million tons, behind the UK with 3.8 million tons³. All those ships took part in the battle of the Atlantic, while some were also found in the theaters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The smaller tonnage ships were used exclusively on the coastal transportation routes of North Africa, while those that had the misfortune to be blockaded in Greece by the German invasion were seized and used by the invaders.

The majority of oceangoing ships managed by Greek shipowners in the prewar period were overage steamships⁴. Because of their low speed in comparison with the more modern Allied merchant ships, the Greek vessels were often left alone behind the convoys, easy prey for wolves of the ocean which were lying in waiting. It is noteworthy that the speed of the convoys was set at about eight knots and that convoy ships were forbidden to delay to search for and rescue men of other convoy vessels that were attacked and shipwrecked.

In addition to the danger of being sunk by submarines we must add the danger from air raids, mines and Axis raider ships camouflaged as innocent cargoships. Finally let us not forget the usual dangers inherent in shipping which the Greek seamen had to face: dangers from the elements of nature and dangers from mechanical failures, which were not usual phenomena for the overage ships of the fleet and the poor navigational aids of that time, especially in unfavorable weather conditions.

So, all the rules of the war game were against the Greek ships and their seamen who, unarmed and in full knowledge of the dangers they faced, played the role of the prey against the heavily armed and usually invisible hunter. And for those ships which succeeded in carrying out their mission without being hit by enemy torpedoes there was the next mission awaiting them under the same condi-

tions and with the same means. For the vessels which were sunk, God help the seamen who were not fortunate enough to follow their ship to its grave site or to be picked up in time by allied or even enemy ships. The shipwrecked seamen faced an endless ocean and an almost certain tragic death from cold, hunger and thirst.

When war was declared in 1939, Greece remained neutral. Greek shipping, however, had in 1938 already promised to stand at the side of the Allies with ships, either timechartered directly to the British government or chartered on the free market, but always at the service of the Allies or neutral countries, mainly Switzerland. Thus, when Greece entered the war in October 1940 its shipping industry was already in the front line of battle, having already lost 80 ships as well as 300 Greek seafarers through acts of war.

When Greece entered the war the entire Greek merchant fleet was commandeered by the Greek government which in turn chartered it to the British government for the needs of the Allies. This agreement, known as the Anglo-Hellenic Agreement, was signed under most unfavorable war time terms for the Greek shipowners with charter rates barely covering the operating costs of the ships thus leaving minuscule profit. Furthermore, the wholesale timechartering of the Greek flag ships to the British resulted in the loss by Greek interests of their corresponding business and administration functions.

Meanwhile, back at home, when war broke out on the northern borders of Greece the Union of Greek Shipowners and the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping jointly launched a fund raising drive among the shippowners and seafarers to support the war effort. This produced impressive results. Just a few weeks after the declaration of the Greek-Italian war more than \$800,000 were collected, a substantial amount for that time. Later, with the German invasion of 1941, the Union of Greek Shipowners burned all relevant documents to prevent the invaders learning the ownership details of Greek ships. During the German occupation the same Union vigorously avoided cooperating with the Germans, refusing to divulge details about the shipowning interests of its members, whose ships were each fighting their own battles at sea all over the world. In occupied Greece the resistance from Greek seafarers who were forced to man the transports of the Germans in the Greek archi-

pelago swelled. Greek seamen were sending information to the Allies and sabotaging the merchant ships which had been forced into service by the Germans. The number of Greek seafarers who lost their lives during raids by allied planes on occupied Greece was not insignificant.

While Greece was paying its own blood tribute to the war effort of the Allies, other countries were enjoying the guilty silence of neutrality, often even cooperating with the Axis forces, neutrality suiting their economic interests. Which countries should one point the finger at first? General Franco's Spain, which, in addition to ideological support, provided the Nazis with manganese ore needed for the manufacture of large and small gun barrels? The Portuguese who supplied tungsten for the German aircraft industry, the Swedes who supplied iron ore, the Romanians who supplied oil, or the South Americans who provided diamonds for the machine tools of the war industry? These were the raw materials which Hitler's war effort depended on to a great extent. All this was bought through the kind intervention of the Swiss who, aside from their own exports of high quality arms to the Third Reich, facilitated the international financial dealings of the Germans. Last but not least is Turkey, who in addition to its mass exports of chromium – a raw material for ball bearings and shell cases – proved her neutrality by sending back to the German invaders – and to certain death any Greek patriot who, hoping to reach the free Middle East, escaped by boat or even by swimming to Turkey and fell into the hands of Turkish border guards. Towards the end of the war however realizing that the scales of victory began to weigh on the side of the Allies, Turkey sped to "fight" at their side. Since then she has enjoyed the well known scandalously privileged treatment from the great western powers of the day.

But Greece and its merchant fleet were true to the allied fight from the very beginning to the very end, as they had also been during the First World War. The price paid for their loyalty to the Allies and to their common values and ideology was high indeed this time also. Two thousand seafarers lost their lives dragged to the depths of the oceans. As many again were wounded and disabled thus ending their careers at sea⁵. Finally, 150 crewmen developed severe psychological problems from the horrors they had

witnessed or from deprivations while being shipwrecked in the oceans. In all more than 20 per cent of the Greek seafaring labor force was taken out of action, a percentage higher than the 15 per cent of the seamen of the entire British Commonwealth Nations.

As for the losses of ships, in this case also the numbers speak for themselves. At the end of the war there was just a quarter of the prewar fleet left with regards to the number of ships and tonnage⁶. The overwhelming majority of ships which were lost were sunk by torpedoes from submarines and by air raid attacks. Not few were sunk by mines both during and after the end of the war and by enemy battleships and raiding ships⁷. There were also of course normal losses from accidents at sea not directly linked to the conditions of the war. In this period, the allied merchant fleet and neutral countries which were serving it lost a total of 4,770 ships totaling 21 million tons because of the war⁸. Greek shipping's share of these losses came to 10 per cent of the number of ships and 6.8 per cent of the tonnage. This was an unprecedented financial disaster for the Greek Shipowners, many of whom saw their fleets wiped out completely during the war. And as if this was not enough, Greek shipowners risked losing their meagre profits from the war, and most importantly, their insurance compensation for the decimation of their fleet which were tied up in British banks for years after the war ended. Apparently the Greek state considered it wise to continue playing the role of the shipowner even after the war ended and tried to appropriate the compensations. The solution to this problem was finally provided by the British courts which handed down a decision particularly humbling to the Greek Government⁹. Thus these funds were not lost to the shipowners, but nevertheless, because of currency restrictions, they continued to be tied up for years in British banks. This of course put a brake on the post-war development of Greek shipping.

In addition to the serious financial problems mentioned previously, shipowners had to face other problems with some of their own crews. An essentially non-existent Greek state and the exclusion of Greek shipowners by the Anglo-Hellenic Agreement to manage their own vessels during the war gave the opportunity to a small number of seafarer unionists who were instigated by the communists to spread anarchy among crews by calling for hugely ex-

cessive pay demands. As if wage demands were more precious than surviving the hell of a worldwide war...

This was, in a few words, the contribution of the Greek shipowner and the Greek seaman in the Second World War. As we have seen, their loyalty to the Allies and to their values and ideology was not circumstantial. Greek shipping has proved over and over again that it is always ready to offer its services for the good of the nation and humankind, whenever the need arises. It proved this recently during the Gulf War of 1991, when of the 112 merchant vessels chartered for the United Nations intervention in Kuwait by the Americans, more than half were vessels controlled by Greek interests. During the same period, the Greek shipowners in Solidy respecting the United Nations sponsored trade boycott of Iraq, gave the world their own lesson in trade ethics.

In closing, for those of you who wonder what ever became of Captain Anthony Liosis, I should mention that together with his two companions, after undergoing the frightful experience of 36 days and nights on a raft with the bare minimum of water and food, they were finally rescued by a passing ship.

It was God's will that Captain Liosis was saved and was later able to testify at a war crimes trial in Hamburg. Just as it was God's will that in the dock at the same trial was the captain of the submarine U-852, Heinz Wilhelm Eick. Captain Eick was sentenced to death along with two other officers of the submarine because after sinking the *Peleus* "they deliberately murdered the survivors of the vessel by machine gun and hand grenades, contrary to the law of war".

For the rest of the crew of the "*Peleus*" and the two thousand other Greek heroes of the seas who were lost during the years of the Great War, all that remains are the memories of their loved ones and the stars of the night that shine on their graves in the sea. No honours, no medals. Only silence. The fate of true heroes.

¹ All vessel capacities in the text and statistics of this book are in grt (gross register tons). The term corresponds to the total capacity of the ship, which includes the volume of all closed spaces (cargo and ballast holds, machinery, crew accommodation, storage spaces etc).

² See table 1

³ See table 2

⁴ According to Lloyd's Register of Shipping statistics, in June 1939, 78% of the Greek merchant fleet consisted of vessels over 20 years old, 16% between 10 and 20 years and just 6% of the ships were less than 10 years of age. The same statistics reveal that Greece was classed last among the traditional maritime nations in terms of fleet age profile.

⁵ See table 3

⁶ See table 4

⁷ See table 5

⁸ See table 6

⁹ We refer here to shipowner A. Vergotis' case, where the Greek government not only suffered a major legal defeat, but was also humiliated in court by the British judge.

TABLE 1: THE MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE MAJOR MARITIME NATIONS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II (JUNE 1939)

NATION	NUMBER OF SHIPS	%	TOTAL TONNAGE (IN GRT)	%
1. UNITED KINGDOM	6,722	22.6	17,891,134	26.1
2. USA	2,853	9.6	11,361,533	16.6
3. JAPAN	2,337	7.9	5,629,845	8.2
4. NORWAY	1,987	6.7	4,833,813	7.1
5. GERMANY	2,459	8.3	4,482,662	6.6
6. ITALY	1,227	4.1	3,424,804	5.0
7. NETHERLANDS	1,523	5.1	2,969,578	4.3
8. FRANCE	1,231	4.1	2,933,933	4.3
9. GREECE	607	2.0	1,780,666	2.6
10. SWEDEN	1,231	4.1	1,577,120	2.3
11. USSR	699	2.3	1,305,959	1.9
12. CANADA	792	2.7	1,223,961	1.8
13. DENMARK	705	2.4	1,174,944	1.7
14. SPAIN	777	2.6	902,251	1.3
15. PANAMA	159	0.5	717,525	1.0
16. FINLAND	402	1.4	590,254	0.9
17. BRAZIL	293	1.0	484,870	0.7
18. BELGIUM	200	0.7	408,418	0.6
19. YUGOSLAVIA	187	0.6	410,486	0.6
20. ARGENTINA	295	1.0	290,602	0.4
21. OTHER NATIONS	3,077	10.3	4,115,074	6.0
WORLD TOTAL	29,763	100.0	68,509,432	100.0

Notes:

- ° Ships of less than 100 grt are not included.
- ° Sailing ships and non-propelled craft are not included.

Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Statistical Tables.

TABLE 2: THE MAJOR FLEETS OF OCEAN TRAMP SHIPS OF ABOVE 2,500 GRT IN 1937

NATION	TOTAL OCEAN TRAMP TONNAGE (in grt)	PERCENTAGE OF OCEAN TRAMP TONNAGE IN TOTAL NATIONAL MERCHANT FLEET
1. U.K.	3,826,000	19%
2. GREECE	1,583,000	86%
3. JAPAN	1,100,000	25%
4. NORWAY	800,000	19%
5. ITALY	660,000	21%
6. GERMANY	480,000	13%
7. SWEDEN	225,000	16%
8. SPAIN	220,000	23%
9. NETHERLANDS	180,000	7%
10. DENMARK	150,000	14%
11. FRANCE	134,000	4%
12. OTHER NATIONS	474,000	
TOTAL	9,832,000	

Notes:

• Ocean or deep-sea tramp: any vessel with a tonnage of 2,500 grt or above which, in the long run, does not have a fixed itinerary and which carries mainly dry cargoes in bulk over relatively long distances and from one or more ports to one or more ports. (Source: B.N. Metaxas, "The Economics of Tramp Shipping", p. 6)

• The above statistics were compiled by the Tramp Administrative Committee in view of the establishment of the Minimum Freight Rate Scheme of the River Plate. The Scheme was introduced from March 1935 through the day following the eruption of World War II (September 4, 1939). Its main objective was to confront the great dry cargo market depression of the 30's by imposing a minimum freight rate level for grain cargoes out of the River Plate in South America, the main loading area of ocean tramps of those days. The Scheme was conceived and promoted by the Greek Shipping community. It was originally backed by the British and, later on, by the Norwegians, the Dutch, the French and the Italians. Although the figures refer to the year 1937, they are extremely useful in our research, being (as estimated) very close to pre-war figures.

Source: *Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee*, Epitheorissis Emporikou Naftikou 1938, p. 1019.

**TABLE 3: LOSSES OF SEAMEN SERVING ON BOARD
MERCHANT SHIPS DURING WORLD WAR II**

NATION	SEAMEN	% LOST
1. UNITED KINGDOM and others	31,908	55.6
2. USA	5,662	9.9
3. NORWAY	4,795	8.4
4. GREECE	2,000	3.5
5. NETHERLANDS	1,914	3.3
6. DENMARK	1,886	3.3
7. CANADA	1,437	2.5
8. BELGIUM	893	1.6
9. SOUTH AFRICA	182	0.3
10. AUSTRALIA	109	0.2
11. NEW ZEALAND	72	0.1
12. NEUTRAL COUNTRIES	6,500	11.3
TOTAL	57,358	100%

Notes:

• The total number of Greek seamen lost during the Second World War is the lowest estimate. The percentage of those lost in comparison to the total active Greek seafaring work force before the War is at least 15%. The same percentage applies for the United Kingdom.

• United Kingdom's seamen include Lascars. Chinese, Arabs and other miscellaneous nationalities, such as those from British colonies and those from Europe serving on British-flag merchant ships.

Sources: -*Naftika Chronika*, 15.01.1966 p. XVII.
-Slader J., *The Fourth Service-Merchantmen at War 1939-1945* p.320.

**TABLE 4: THE GREEK MERCHANT FLEET BEFORE AND
AFTER WORLD WAR II (1939-1945)**

TYPES OF SHIIPS	GREEK MERCHANT FLEET AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR		WARTIME LOSSES		REMAINS OF THE GREEK MERCHANT FLEET AT THE END OF THE WAR	
	TOTAL SHIPS	TOTAL TONNAGE (in grt)	TOTAL SHIPS	%	TOTAL TONNAGE (in grt)	%
CARGO SHIPS	5001	766,353	37Z	74.41	300,827	73.6
PASSENGER						
SHIP	55	49,995	52	94.5	43 686	87.4
CRUISE LINER	1	16,990	—	—	—	—
VARIOUS	21	3,977	7	33.3	2,009	50.5
SAILING						
SHIPS	712	55,160	551	77.4	52.634	954
	161	2,526				
TOTAL	1,289	1,892,475	982	76.2	1,399,156	73.9
	307	493,319				

Notes:

• The above table includes ships exclusively under greek flag. Additionally, at the beginning of the War, the Greek-owned fleet comprised 124 cargo ships (454,318,grt) under British and Panamanian registry. Another 22 cargoships were permanently operating in the coastal trades of China. Finally, an unspecified number and tonnage of riverships and tugboats were employed in the Danube.

• During the War, the Greek Government purchased 6 cargoships (39,335 grt). Another 15 (107,500 grt), of which 14 were liberty ships, were ceded to Greece by the U.S. Government for the nations war requirements.

Source: *Naftika Chronika*, 15.01.1966, p. IV, XII. XIII.

TABLE 5: ANALYSIS OF GREEK FLAG MERCHANT SHIP LOSSES DURING WORLD WAR II

-A- Losses classed by size of ship

Size of Ship	Total ships lost	Total tonnage lost (in grt)
Of 499 grt or less	75	18,435
Above 499 grt	384	1,392,176
Unspecified	38	-
Total	497	1,410,611

-B- Losses classed by type of ship

Type of ship	Total ships lost	Total tonnage lost (in grt)
Dry Cargo Ships and Tankers	370	1,315,147
Passenger Ships and Yachts	49	35,152
Hospital Ships	6	8,975
Tugs and Salvage Vessels	13	1,729
Unspecified	59	49,608
Total	497	1,410,611

-C- Losses classed by cause of loss

Cause of loss	Total Ships lost	Total lost (in grt)
Torpedoed and/or rammed by submarine	134	545,464
Sunk by aircraft	144	267,151
Sunk by mine	24	76,578
Sunk by raider ship	9	43,425
Sunk due to marine accident of unspecified direct or indirect pertinence to wartime conditions	32	114,836
Sunk by mine or torpedoed	1	7,247
Sunk by surface warship	1	440
Sunk by unspecified shell fire	1	194
Sunk as block-ship during Normandy Invasion	2	7,390
Sunk due to confirmed war cause but of unspecified nature	67	113,498
Sunk after the end of the war by mine or underwater explosion	12	18,450
Sold	25	92,876
Captured by enemy	45	123,062
Total	497	1,410,611

-D- Losses classed by time of loss

Time of loss	Total ships	Total tonnage lost (in grt)
Lost prior to October 28, 1940	96	377,394
October 28, 1940- December 31, 1940	15	42,942
1941	212	454,449
1942	65	246,324
1943	25	99,530
1944	19	44,736
January 1, 1945 - August 14, 1945	2	12,064
Lost after August 14, 1945	12	18,450
Lost at unspecified date	51	114,722
Total	497	1,410,611

Source: Haratsis, S. J., "Hellenic Merchant Marine Losses During World War II", Hellenic Navy, Navy History Service, Naval History Section, Athens, 1992

TABLE 6: LOSSES OF ALLIED AND NEUTRAL COUNTRY MERCHANT FLEETS (1939 - 1945)

CAUSE OF LOSS	UNITED KINGDOM		USA		OTHER ALLIES		NEUTRAL COUNTRIES		TOTAL	
	SHIPS	'000 grt	SHIPS	'000 grt	SHIPS	'000 grt	SHIPS	'000 grt	SHIPS	'000 grt
SUBMARINE										
ATTACK	1,360	7,620	440	2,740	670	3,260	300	930	2,770	14,550
MINE HIT	340	830	15	90	75	210	90	270	520	1,400
RAIDER										
SHIP ATTACK	210	970	13	90	87	460	20	50	330	1,570
AIRCRAFT										
ATTACK	440	1,590	58	360	202	770	50	110	750	2,830
OTHER ACTS										
OF WAR	220	370	12	30	138	330	30	60	400	790
TOTAL	2,570	11,380	538	3,310	1,172	5,030	490	1,420	4,770	21.140

Notes:

• In total, Allied and neutral country fleets lost 40% of their pre-war capacity by acts of war. The respective percentage of the United Kingdom is 54.19% and for the USA almost 35%. However, let us not forget that those two countries had the capability to renew their war casualties during the War, whereas this was impossible for Greece and the other Allies.

• Vessels captured by or employed in the trades of the Axis are not included. However, Finnish, Hungarian, Italian and Japanese merchant ships lost before these countries entered the War are included. So are French ships before the occupation of France and merchant ships of free France not controlled by the Government of Vichy.

• Losses from usual sea perils are not included. These are comprised of 610 British (1,200,000 grt), 251 Allied (710,000 grt) and 490 neutral (680,000 grt) ships.

Sources: -*Naftika Chronika*, 15/1/1957 p.141. -
- *Naftika Chronika*, 15/1/1966 p. XII.

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